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structures, many of which were located 
downtown commercial areas. There was 
s 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
however, other methodical and efforts 
can also pursue less costly approaches. The state 
and local governments, the private sector, and 
citizens can take many prudent and economical 
measures to reduce future losses and facilitate 
recovery. 
In addition, the Commission suggests that 
the state spend or authorize money for building 
rehabilitation only if assured that the resulting 
projects will identify earthquake hazards and 
mitigate them to the extent practicable. 
Another consideration behind the primary 
recommendations is recent estimates of the 
likelihood of a major earthquake. The 
Commission accepts the validity of scientific 
forecasts showing a 90 percent chance of a large 
earthquake striking a major California urban 
center at some time in the next 30 years. Such 
an event in either southern or northern 
California would cause 10 to 20 times as much 
damage, loss, and social disruption as that 
resulting from the Lorna Prieta earthquake. 
Consequently, the Commission recommends 
State and local decisions take this likelihood 
into account when setting program priorities 
and allocating resources. Public information and 
response capacity building efforts should be 
stepped up. Local and regional emergency 
planning should be expanded and exercises 
should be held more frequently. Resources 
allocated for hazard reduction should be 
redirected to regions known to have high near-
term risks of experiencing major earthquakes. 
Finally, a third factor underlying the 
Commission's recommendations is awareness 
that future earthquake damage will not be 
distributed randomly. Damage patterns are 
generally and are correlated 
with structures' age, the 
and site geologic conditions. Combinations of 
these conditions can be found 
:~n•<TWhP1rP in the but 
resistant 
~~,"~~e.~, many others are more 
densely housed and in older buildings 
and neighborhoods that are quite vulnerable to 
failures and falling hazards. Many commuting 
urban workers are also exposed to such life-
threatening hazards on a daily basis. This 
indicates that the catastrophic potential that 
already threatens Californians most at risk to 
earthquake damage is increasing. 
The three factors noted-tight fiscal 
constraints, expected near-term large 
earthquakes in urban areas, and the growing 
numbers of people in particularly vulnerable 
buildings and locales-prompted the 
Commission to highlight cost-effective 
recommendations emphasizing the areas known 
to be most vulnerable to earthquakes. 
Summary of Major 
Recommendations 
NEW CONSTRUCTION 
The most cost-effective long-term protection 
from the impacts of earthquakes is to ensure 
that new construction is designed and built to 
withstand seismic forces consistent with the 
performance goals of the Commission's Risk 
Policy (SSC 91-01). Current seismic codes and 
design practices emphasize life safety. Owners 
should be made aware that these minimum 
standards are not intended to assure a building's 
survival in a functional or even a repairable 
condition after an earthquake. Some owners 
already recognize this and make prudent 
business decisions to assure higher level of 
seismic by on higher-
than-code minimum design and a thorough 
awareness of the construction process. Other 
owners should be encouraged to adapt this kind 
of sensible and fiscally sound for their 
new construction. 
Architects and to 
owners to make definite decisions in 
2 
cn.oosmi,R levels of seismic 
that are to the 
intended long-term use of their structures. The 
Commission's 1991 report Policy on Acceptable 
Levels of Earthquake Risk in State Buildings 
develops this policy in more detail. Furthermore 
codes and performance standards are effective 
if the designs are properly executed and are 
enforced through quality assurance programs. 
To be effective, the program should include 
independent peer review of plans for all 
important structures; checking of design 
drawings, calculations, and specifications; 
adequate construction inspection; and 
observation of key construction details by 
responsible design professionals. The 
Commission is committed to continuing its 
effort to secure wider acceptance of this 
approach to decisions on new construction. 
STATE SPENDING UMITA TIONS 
The State should no longer aid in extending 
the economic life of older and potentially 
dangerous facilities unless the hazards are 
in an appropriate, cost effective 
manner. The Seismic Commission 
recommends that the State of California a 
policy discouraging use of state money or state-
administered funds to rehabilitate "'"'''"u"l> 
structures unless ""JIJ'JH''-' 
demonstrate that seismic hazard mitigation 
The 
older structures. Where uv,"'"J''-· 
involvement should include a 
appropriate seismic retrofit of such older 
structures when are rehabilitated. 
Consistent guidelines or standards 
should be applied when older 
3 
LOMA PRIETA'S CALL TO ACTION 
structures are 
state or money. 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
The Lorna Prieta earthquake's epicenter was 
distant from the Bay Area's major population 
centers, and governmental response to the 
errterj~er:tci(~S caused by the earthquake was 
generally adequate. In several cases, however, 
available resources were stretched to capacity, 
and a more destructive earthquake with an 
urban epicenter on the Hayward fault or the 
Peninsula segment of the San Andreas fault 
would overwhelm the Bay Area's existing 
emergency response capabilities. Improvements 
are needed in personnel training and 
equipment, particularly communications. The 
adequacy of older underground water systems 
should also be systematically evaluated. In 
several locations, the earthquake destroyed 
water systems, dramatically limiting firefighting 
capabilities. The value of pre-earthquake 
in the regular routine practice of 
emergency response was often rated as the most 
important contributor to good in 
responding to the Lorna Prieta earthquake. 
Several more recommendations are 
noted below. 
Management. There is an 
need to enhance, and improve 
California's current tmu~rgelrlCJ 
The system should be 
and :.rr·pntP£1 
emergency occurs. 
Communications. The ~~u"·""'''• Whittier 
and Lorna Prieta once 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
ini·Pr•·nr•tir.n of radio and teleonone 
communication A full and 
comprehensive review of those 
should be made. That review should lnrnn,,w,tP 
knowledge about the role satellite communica-
tions can play in a major emergency. This 
review should also evaluate the potential for 
diminished effectiveness of cellular phone 
systems when they are used simultaneously by 
many who converge at the same general 
location. The impact of piecemeal 
implementation of the 800 Megahertz (800 
MHz) communication systems on mutual aid 
response capabilities should also be included. 
Mass Care And Shelter. Even a moderate 
earthquake can rapidly overwhelm the ability of 
local governmental and volunteer organizations 
to provide immediate and long-term care and 
shelter. Additional local organizations need to 
be brought into the process of planning for and 
providing emergency care and shelter. These 
capacity building efforts should include 
organizations representing the diversity of 
citizens most at risk in each locale. 
HAZARD REDUCTION IN EXISTING 
STRUCTURES 
Building damage by the Lorna Prieta earth-
quake confirmed the value of ongoing efforts to 
improve the seismic resistance of existing 
buildings and other structures. The Commission 
should therefore continue to seek a high priority 
for such efforts in California's seismic safety 
program. As expected, building damage was 
notably high in older unbraced mobile 
homes without under-
pinnings, and unreinforced masonry (URM) 
buildings. Although important progress is 
made in confronting the URM building 
California has not yet mustered the "'~'"U'~"· 
resolve to seismic or 
of older homes or of mobile homes. Nor has 
California begun to deal with some other 
significant hazardous building types 
nonductile concrete). The state's next 
""1 u''""" could tip the balance 
from inaction to particularly if the 
groundwork for further progress has been well 
laid. Consequently the Commission and others 
are obligated to continue informing owners 
about the value of prompt action in taking 
adequate precautions to reduce their future 
earthquake losses. 
A related concern is the absence of consensus 
standards for nonductile concrete structures, to 
guide hazard evaluation, cost estimation, and 
retrofit practice. Lack of such standards is a 
significant impediment to either encouraging or 
requiring retrofit of such nonductile structures, 
as well as other potentially hazardous types of 
buildings. Accordingly development of 
guidelines for nonductile concrete structures 
and other potentially unsafe buildings is 
another high-priority Commission 
recommendation. 
State Facilities. Governor Deukmejian's 
Board of Inquiry on the collapse of the Cypress 
Overpass recommended in its report, Competing 
Against Time, that seismic safety be a priority 
consideration for all state government facilities. 
It urged the state to take the following steps to 
achieve the goals of seismic safety and 
maintenance of critical functions after 
earthquakes: 
" Complete programs of seismic retrofitting 
of existing hazardous facilities 
• Review and revise seismic safety standards 
to meet these goals 
• Require independent review of major 
designs of facilities 
4 
• Conduct vigorous programs to enhance 
VT\,Pr~i<P in earthquake 
engineering and earthquake research 
considerable progress and funding 
have been realized in the State's Department of 
Transportation, similar efforts have either not 
been started or have lagged in nearly all other 
state (see the Commission's report on 
Executive Order number SSC 90-
06). These shc>rtc:orrlinJi/;S 
addressed. The Commission and others must 
work harder to enhance hazard reduction efforts 
or otherwise we face the same lessons and 
consequences after future earthquakes. The 
Commission must also continue to review and 
assess the adequacy of seismic hazard reduction 
programs of all state agencies. 
The State of California should review the 
geological siting and structural design of 
seismidy suspect State-owned buildings and 
privately owned buildings occupied by State 
agencies. Where warranted, facilities should be 
retrofitted or abandoned if necessary to protect 
the public, state employees, and university 
students, as well as the continuity of emergency 
response and other essential services functions. 
Priorities for these efforts should be based on 
the likelihood of future major earthquakes 
striking as well as the quality of design and 
construction. 
RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION 
Standards For Repair Of Damaged 
Buildings. Damage assessment and repair cost 
estimating after the Lorna Prieta earthquake 
were time-consuming and confusing. There was 
too much duplication of effort in deciding on 
methods and estimating costs of repairing 
damaged structures. Consequently loans and 
grants were delayed, and restoration of 
community vitality retarded. Accordingly, the 
State should formulate guidelines and minimum 
standards for damaged building repair and 
seismic upgrading. The standards should apply 
unless individual local governments adopt 
higher standards. 
Damaged historical buildings can also pose 
difficult decisions. The owner may find repair 
financially infeasible whereas demolition will 
remove a valuable community asset. Repair 
decisions are hindered by lack of repair 
financial aid, and methods of in 
advance which are the critically important 
buildings that should be saved. The 
Commission should help enlist appropriate 
agencies and organizations in identifying and 
retrofitting California's historic buildings, and 
5 
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Model And Requirements For Com-
munity Recovery Planning. Recently the 
Governor's Office of Emergency Services' 
Southern California Earthquake Preparedness 
Project (SCEPP), released an important 
publication, Recovery and Reconstruction Planning 
Guidelines for Local Governments. This 
publication represents several years of work that 
brought together a wide variety of 
knowledgeable people, including community 
officials from Whittier and Santa Cruz. The State 
OES (including SCEPP, BAREPP and the Disaster 
Assistance Division) should be funded to 
undertake, along with selected local 
governments, an experiment in implementing 
the new guidelines. This would provide viable 
planning models to guide other jurisdictions. 
The Commission is committed to help OES 
organize and obtain resources for such an 
action-oriented demonstration effort. 
State Recovery Planning. Although 
recovery from the Lorna Prieta earthquake is still 
in progress and many reconstruction projects 
have barely begun, several major impediments 
to timely, effective community recovery have 
emerged as issues of statewide interest. The State 
must work in cooperation with the appropriate 
federal agencies and the private-sector to resolve 
these issues and facilitate expeditious recovery 
from future urban earthquakes. Planning efforts 
should address at least the following issues: (1) 
an overly complicated procedure for processing 
disaster assistance applications; (2) effective 
methods of replacing affordable and low-cost 
housing in conjunction with local governments 
and the (3) the of 
minimum standards for repairing damaged 
buildings; and (4) formulating a practical 
to decisions on repairing or replacing 
historical damaged by earthquakes. 
In addition, Lorna Prieta damage of public 
buildings and other facilities highlighted the 
caused temporary or long-term 
closure. In order to minimize social and 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
after future 
Legal Issues 
Tort concerns have inhibited 
innovation in the seismic retrofitting of 
potentially hazardous buildings as well as the 
development of seismidy resistant new 
buildings. Local governments and design 
professionals need a legal benchmark [standard] 
that is defined and easy to articulate for 
use when their judgement suggests 
that it is appropriate to depart from existing 
building codes in mitigating seismic hazards in 
buildings and structures. The Commission 
should enlist representatives of local 
governments, design professionals, and the legal 
community in developing a framework that 
encourages local governments and design 
professionals to exercise creativity and apply 
their best judgment without unwarranted 
apprehension of tort liability consequences. 
6 
Purpose of This Report 
This report's primary purpose is to summarize 
the results of the Seismic Safety Commission's 
investigation of the 1989 Lorna Prieta 
earthquake. The investigation had two primary 
objectives: 1) to look for unique insights and 
new information; and 2) to assess the 
effectiveness of current policies, programs and 
plans for reducing casualties and damage, and 
meeting recovery system demands, during and 
after large earthquakes. Based on the findings, 
the Commission is making recommendations to 
improve seismic safety and postearthquake 
response and recovery in California. Some of 
these require Commission response and some 
call for actions by others. 
Post-Lorna Prieta earthquake 
recommendations and actions by the 
Commission and others have already influenced 
Commission programs and priorities, including 
its legislative agenda, its research plan, and the 
California Earthquake Hazard Reduction program. 
The findings will also be reflected in 
Commission activities undertaken to improve 
the earthquake performance of existing and new 
buildings and other structures. 
Some extremely important legislative and 
executive policy initiatives have already been 
put into effect. One of the most striking is 
Governor's Executive Order D-86-90 directing 
the several state agencies having responsibility 
for many of the state-owned buildings and 
structures to make seismic safety a priority 
consideration in the allocation of resources. 
Governor Deukmejian's action resulted in part 
from the findings of his appointed Board of 
Inquiry on the 1989 Lorna Prieta 
The Board's Report to the Governor, Competing 
Against Time (May 1990), identified three 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
essential challenges that must be addressed by 
the citizens of California, if they expect a future 
reasonably safe from earthquakes: 
• Ensure that earthquake risks posed by new 
construction are acceptable. 
• Identify and correct unacceptable seismic 
safety conditions in existing structures. 
• Develop and implement actions that foster 
the rapid, effective, and economic 
response to and recovery from damaging 
earthquakes. 
These recommendations also reaffirm old 
lessons from earlier earthquakes. They apply not 
only to the design and construction of highway 
structures and bridges (the failure of which 
prompted the Board's formation) but also to all 
other major structures and facilities in the state. 
During its investigation, the Commission 
took testimony and consulted a wide variety of 
sources, both published and unpublished. As 
soon as possible after the earthquake, the 
Commission conducted eight public hearings at 
locations throughout the affected area and in 
Sacramento in order to receive fresh 
information from 120 persons representing 
government, citizens and businessl. The 
testimony concentrated on personal 
descriptions of the earthquake and its damage, 
and related experiences and observations 
immediately after the earthquake as well as in 
the weeks that followed. The 
were held at these locations: 
INrRODUCfiON 
LOCATION 
San Francisco 
Oakland 
San Francisco 
Santa Cruz 
Watsonville 
San 
Sacramento 
Sacramento 
DATE 
1989 
November 8, 1989 
November 9, 1989 
November 1989 
November 1989 
November 15, 1989 
1989 
auun1uJ"l, the Commission and 
HH~ U<lA\C and 
both the Whittier Narrows and the Lorna Prieta 
350 serious Almost one-third of this 
damage was to older, elevated highway 
structures and These failures also caused 
two thirds (42) of the total deaths. Other 
damage was concentrated in the older 
downtown core areas and older housing in the 
communities nearest the Hollister, 
Los Santa and Watsonville. 
the 
uauu•xc occurred at soft soils 
locations in Oakland and San 50-60 
from the 
severe occurred in modern structures; 
several newer San Francisco hotels were 
of 
LOMA PRIETA'S CALL TO AGnON 
the marine research facilities at Moss LaJ,lu•u~ 
and at the Oakland which closed the 
north section of a runway. the had 
A series of surface fractures occurred in the 
Summit Road area of the Santa Cruz mountains. 
The largest of these near the 
intersection of Summit Road and 17, 
was 650 feet 2.5 feet wide with a 2.5-foot 
offset at one location. There continues to be 
concern that the may have 
reactivated some long-dormant landslides 
through the mountainous area, and detailed 
of this potential is continuing. 
Despite its brevity, the Lorna Prieta 
did in fact cause very signitilca11t 
liquefaction-related damage in many areas from 
the Salinas Valley to the of San Francisco 
lasted au'""c'"w 
among 
Marina, the foot Market Street area, 
south of Market Street and 
Creek district. In areas such as 
Notable examples of liquefaction damage 
occurred at Oakland Port Authority facilities, at 
movement. 
TABLE 1-1 
History of San Francisco Bay Area 
Earthquakes Magnitude or greater 
Year Location Fault 
1836 Hayward Hayward (Northern segment) 
1838 San Francisco Peninsula San Andreas 
1852 San Francisco Peninsula San Andreas 
1858 San jose Hayward (Southern segment) 
1861 Livermore Calaveras 
1865 Santa Cruz Mountains San Andreas 
1868 Hayward Hayward (Southern Segment) 
1906 San Francisco San Andreas 
1911 San jose Calaveras 
1989 Lorna Prieta San Andreas 
The newer, artificial fills that were RELATIONSHIP TO FUTURE 
EARTHQUAKES created for residential development south of San 
Francisco performed well, although this short 
Estimated 
Magnitude 
7+ 
7+ 
-6.5 
-6.5 
7+ 
7+ 
6.7 
8.3 
6.6 
7.1 
duration earthquake did not a good test Studies of seismicity in California and other 
of these filled areas. areas where major tectonic meet indicate 
9 
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that great earthquakes tend to be preceded by 
periods of increased seismic activity, which then 
diminishes afterward. That is, there is an 
historic pattern of large and major earthquakes 
clustering before a great earthquake. As 
indicated on Table 1-1, after the 1906 
earthquake (and a sizable Magnitude 6.5 in 
1911), there was a long period of low seismic 
activity until the mid 1950s, but since that time 
there has been increasing seismic activity in 
northern California. During the ten years since 
1979, there have been four Magnitude (M) 6.0 
or greater Bay Area earthquakes whereas in the 
previous 68 years there had been none. This 
knowledge and other scientific information 
have led a working group of experts for the 
National Earthquake Prediction Council to 
estimate that the probability of a major 
earthquake (M 7.0 or larger) affecting the San 
Francisco Bay area sometime during the next 30 
years is 67 percent, or 2:1. In addition, an 
apparent historical relation between the 
Hayward and the San Andreas faults suggests 
that a significant earthquake on one fault is 
followed within a few years by a similar event 
on the other. 
The Earthquake in 
Perspective 
The Lorna Prieta earthquake affected many 
more buildings, people and jurisdictions than 
any California earthquake since the Los Angeles 
region was hit by the 1933 Long Beach 
earthquake. Thus the 1989 event is the first 
occasion in nearly sixty years to assess the 
effects of a large multijurisdictional earthquake. 
By simultaneously affecting widespread 
populations, businesses and governmental 
agencies, Lorna Prieta highlighted a range of 
troubling problems. These will recur with even 
greater severity in future big urban earthquakes 
that are certain to strike, perhaps at any time. 
With its estimated magnitude of 7.1, the 
Lorna Prieta earthquake was the largest in 
California since the 7.7 Kern County 
(Bakersfield) earthquake of 1952, 37 years 
earlier. As was true in Kern County, the Lorna 
Prieta epicenter was located in an area of 
relatively sparse population. Despite this rural 
epicentral site, which was fortunate in keeping 
down the damage and casualty count, the Lorna 
Prieta earthquake nevertheless directly affected 
the more than 85,000 individuals, families and 
businesses that registered for some form of 
disaster assistance. The overall secondary effects 
were much more widely felt. Almost everyone in 
the entire region was in some way affected. 
Table 1-2 includes 17 damaging earthquakes 
that struck California in the past 20 years. Lorna 
Prieta accounted for over three-quarters (78o/o) of 
the total estimated damage caused by all of 
these earthquakes. 
Major Issues Highlighted 
in the Earthquake 
The Lorna Prieta earthquake highlighted 
several scientific, engineering and policy issues, 
including some that have not commonly arisen 
in recent, smaller California earthquakes. 
Popular images of damage associated with this 
earthquake are typified by the failure of 
elevated, double decked highway structures and 
bridges, including the collapse of the Interstate 
880 Cypress Street viaduct and partial collapse 
of a segment of the Oakland-San Francisco Bay 
Bridge. Smoke from the large fire in the San 
Francisco Marina district was witness to severe 
damage throughout this upper-middle class 
neighborhood. Soft soils throughout the area 
accelerated the ground shaking that, in turn, led 
to locally significant damage to infrastructure 
and older residential buildings. Dramatic scenes 
of deformation and facilities damage due to 
liquefaction in the area controlled by the Port of 
Oakland account for other memorable images of 
the Lorna Prieta earthquake. Severe and 
widespread damage to the vulnerable 
unreinforced masonry buildings was nowhere 
more dramatized than at the Pacific Garden 
Mall; the heart of older downtown Santa Cruz. 
10 
These of also to some 
of the dominant issues immediately raised 
this to the future 
vulnerability of older elevated highway 
structures and bridges, the acceleration of 
ground shaking and associated damage to 
structures located on unmitigated soft soils 
conditions and the continuing vulnerability of 
unreinforced masonry and other older buildings 
that lack resistance to earthquake forces. While 
these and related issues will be briefly addressed 
in this report, they have been, and continue to 
be specifically addressed by ongoing policies 
and programs and have already been subject of 
reports and studies by the Seismic Safety 
Commission and other groups. 
For the reader who seeks detailed discussion 
of the scientific and technical aspects of these 
issues, the following published reports offer an 
excellent beginning. Much of the scientific 
study of the Lorna Prieta earthquake is ongoing, 
with major conclusions yet to be published. 
For a comprehensive summary of effects, see 
LOMA PRIETA'S CALL TO ACfiON 
Reconnaissance 
Cerrito, Oakland] California, 
488 pp. 
For a detailed study of major highway and 
bridge damage see Governor's Board of Inquiry 
on the 1989 Lorna Prieta earthquake, 1990, 
Competing Against Time: Report to Governor 
Deukmejian. State of California, Office of 
Planning and Research, 264 pp. Policy and 
program recommendations are made in that 
report and in Seismic Safety Commission, 1990, 
Report to Governor George Deukmejian on Executive 
Order D-86-90, 25 pp., Sacramento. 
Descriptions and studies of the earthquake's 
geological characteristics are provided by 
Plafker, G., and Galloway, J.P., 1989, Lessons 
Learned from the Lorna Prieta, California, 
EarthquakeofOctober 17, 1989. U.S. Geological 
Survey Circular 1045, 48 pp. and McNutt, 
Stephen R. and Robert H. Sydnor (Eds.), The 
Lorna Prieta (Santa Cruz Mountains), California 
TABLE 1 
Year 
1975 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1980 
1980 
1983 
1984 
1986 
1986 
1986 
1987 
1987 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Damaging California Earthquakes 
1971-1991 
Location 
Oroville 
Santa Barbara 
Imperial Valley 
Livermore Valley 
Mammoth lakes 
Humbolt County (offshore) 
Coalinga 
Morgan Hili 
Palm Springs 
Oceanside 
Chalfant Valley 
Whittier Narrows 
Superstition Hills 
lorna Prieta 
Upland 
Sierra Madre 
Magnitude 
5.7 
5.1 
6.6 
5.5 
6.2 
6.9 
6.5 
6.2 
5.6 
5.3 
6.4 
5.9 
6.6 
7.1 
5.5 
5.8 
Estimated Direct 
Damage($ mimons)Z 
6.7 
24.2 
60.6 
18.4 
3.2 
2.8 
41.0 
12.7 
6.4 
0.5 
415.3 
3.1 
7,940.0 
10.4 
inflated to 1990 value according to Consumer Price Index. Source: Adapted from McNutt and 
Sydnor 1990, p. 137. 
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17 October 1989. 
Mines and Geology, California 
Conservation Special Publication 104, 142 pp. 
The performance of buildings and 
infrastructure is described in EERI (above); in 
H.S. (Ed.), 1989, Performance of Structures 
During the Lorna Prieta Earthquake of October 
1989; in U.S. Department of Commerce, 
National Institute of Standards and 
Special Publication #778, 175 pp.; and in 
Structural Engineers Association of California, 
1991, Reflections on the October 17, 1989, Lorna 
Prieta Earthquake. Ad Hoc Earthquake 
Reconnaissance Committee, 177 pp., 
Sacramento. 
The balance of this report provides syntheses 
of the human, organizational, legal, and fiscal 
of the lorna Prieta earthquake. Where 
possible, policy implications are identified with 
emphasis on what the lorna Prieta earthquake 
experience suggests that California needs to do 
in advance of the large earthquakes that are 
forecast to strike major urban areas within the 
foreseeable future. 
12 
Earthquake Effects 
Society's resources are at risk to earthquake 
damage through failures of the built 
environment. The Lorna Prieta earthquake was a 
moderate geophysical event centered in a 
sparsely populated semi-rural region. 
Nevertheless many of the most vulnerable 
structures in the area were affected by the 
earthquake's forces. Within a few seconds, 
approximately $7.5 billion in direct damage to 
structures had been tallied. 
BUILDINGS 
Pretty much, the type of damage that we saw 
was great damage to our unreinforced masonry 
structures. The Town of Los Gatos is a very old 
and proud historic town, many, many structures 
built right around the tum of the century, and 
even before, and unfortunately, those buildings 
did not perform well. 
We also had the other classic example of 
cripple wall failure in our older districts as well, 
just a substantial number of homes. Perhaps as 
many as 10 percent of our homes have suffered 
some sort of structural damage, and the majority 
of that is a cripple wall failure. 
Scott R. Baker 
Building Official 
Los Gatos 
Few modern buildings were subjected to high 
levels of ground shaking in the Lorna Prieta 
earthquake, consequently this earthquake 
should not be considered to have tested codes 
and construction aimed to reduce life-safety 
Chapter 2 
n 
hazards. In a few cases, newer buildings were 
severely damaged. Several were dosed for repair, 
especially some hotels located on poor soils near 
the San Francisco Airport. One has not yet 
reopened. 
Certain types of older structures known to be 
vulnerable were severely damaged. In all, over 
24,000 residential structures, 3,500 commercial 
businesses, and 140 public buildings in the 
affected ten county area were damaged as a 
result of the earthquake. The most spectacular 
failures involved unreinforced masonry 
buildings. Many of these were located in older 
downtown commercial areas, including 
Hollister, Los Gatos, Santa Cruz and 
Watsonville, where quarter to a third of the 
buildings were severely damaged. In Santa Cruz 
and Watsonville most were razed. At least 900 
unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings were 
damaged in the earthquake. Eight deaths 
resulted from the partial collapse of URM 
buildings. At least 50 of the 900 were 
irreparable, and another 350 were severely 
damaged. The ultimate fate of some of them is 
still unknown. URM building damage was 
notably correlated with soft soils locations. 
In Santa Cruz County many older homes and 
unbraced mobile homes sustained damage. 
About 16o/o of the County's housing stock of 
90,000 was affected directly. Table 2-1 shows the 
type and number of damaged housing by level 
of damage. Approximately 14,100 living units in 
the County were damaged, of which about 900 
were destroyed. Comparable data are not 
available for other affected jurisdictions and no 
agency keeps track of the number of actual 
dwelling units affected. It is known however, 
that approximately 1000 units were destroyed in 
Oakland and about 500 units were permanently 
se 
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lost in San Another 500-600 units in 
San Francisco have not 
vast 
con'lmJu:m;nes should survey 
and homes that have 
insufficient lateral bracing. It's a very 
to strengthen these homes and not lose your 
housing stock. It wouldn't have a 
impact to a community. 
cure 
of Watsonville 
November 14, 1989 
Many older residential wood frame structures 
failed the area. 
damaged structures typically were either not 
fastened to their foundations bolts), 
TABLE 2-1 
Santa Cruz County: Summary Damage to Housing 
Scotts Santa 
Category Capitola Valley Cruz Watsonville Uninc. Countywide 
Destroyed 
Dwellings 3 4 74 237 356 674 
Mobilehomes 0 0 0 4 28 32 
SRO 0 0 187 0 0 187 
Total 3 4 261 241 384 893 
MaJor 
6 14 150 1 2,228 
35 14 0 0 25 300 
41 28 150 
390 740 2 
74 92 0 206 705 
8 
greater then $10,000. Source: Santa 
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had unbraced or had and 
foundations, and almost all the failures involved 
structures not built to current seismic standards. 
Many wood frame residential structures in 
the Marina District of San Francisco failed. 
Typically these structures were four-story 
buildings, with soft first stories having multiple 
openings for garages and little or no cross 
bracing. Failed structures were often located on 
the corner of the block, where there were fewer 
adjacent structures to provide support. In many 
cases, inadequate maintenance, including 
unrepaired termite damage, contributed to these 
failures. The most common type of failure was 
collapse or large distortion of the first story, 
which, in some cases caused the structures to 
topple into the street. The rupture of a gas line 
at one Marina location resulted in the 
spectacular fire seen live on international 
television. 
Other widespread but less dramatic damage 
to residential structures was from unreinforced 
chimney collapse and cracking to walls and 
ceilings. 
In Monterey and San Benito Counties, several 
reinforced concrete cannery warehouses were 
damaged by toppling inventories of stored cans 
which crashed through walls and caused other 
damage. 
HOSPITAlS 
Few hospitals sustained major damage, 
although Watsonville Community Hospital 
nearest to the epicenter suffered both stress 
fractures and floor settlement. The hospital will 
be replaced. There was structural and 
nonstructural damage to the the Veterans 
Administration Medical Center in Palo Alto, 
early estimates for repair approximating $200 
million dollars. A seven-story tower at Oakland's 
Peralta Hospital (constructed in 1927) also 
suffered major damage. 
In other hospitals most damage was 
nonstructural or involved systems-disruption. 
Many problems were identified involving 
inadequately anchored generators and fuel 
LOMA PRIETA'S CALL TO ACTION 
broken fuel insufficient fuel 
or improperly mounted controls. Failure of 
community water systems, coupled with lack of 
backup supplies, curtailed operations of several 
facilities. Several reports indicated that some 
equipment vital to proper diagnosis and 
treatment could not be used because they were 
not included in the critical emergency circuits. 
Elevator cabs and counterweights jumped out 
of their guides, and elevator motor sets and/or 
guide rails were not securely anchored, putting 
elevators out of service and causing significant 
damage to the system. In a few cases, critical 
hospital operations were curtailed due to failures 
of hospital communications systems. In 
addition, many improperly anchored chillers, 
air handling units and other mechanical 
equipment located on facilities' roofs were 
knocked off their supports and sent sliding 
across the roofs, causing significant damage. In 
a few facilities medical gas storage systems 
sustained damage due to poor or inadequate 
anchorage. Numerous facilities also suffered 
nonstructural damage due to inadequate storage 
and poorly anchored shelving, spilling medical 
records, laboratory chemicals, equipment and 
pharmacy medications. 
SCHOOlS 
Following the earthquake many public 
schools in the disaster area were closed briefly as 
a precautionary measure or for lack of utilities. 
Most of the schools reopened soon after 
inspection by qualified structural engineers and 
school district maintenance personnel. Sixty-
four school districts reported damage. Most 
damage was limited to nonstructural building 
elements such as falling ceiling tiles and light 
fixtures, broken water pipes and heating ducts, 
cosmetic cracking of plaster, minor cracks in 
walls, floors, ceilings and stairwells, loose roof 
tiles and cracked chimneys. Two school 
buildings suffered significant structural damage, 
and may need to be permanently closed. 
The Lorna Prieta Elementary School, located 
near the epicenter, experienced significant 
15 
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various locations within the 
area. 
Broken natural gas 
the lrnn:~,rtP'li 
customers were without gas. The 
gas distribution system in San 
Francisco's Marina district was 
LOMA PRIETA'S CALL TO ACfiON 
due to the 
none of the ~u.aa•n~·'"' 
effort to ensure that emergency calls within 
disaster area distance 
to block 
EARTHQUAKE EFFECfS AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
ears. And I remember the hours cnrHitieri'rH! 
the in disasters. And I've to 
to mind what message we're to deliver to 
these people that are caught in that circumstance 
for the future. Can they be-roll themselves into 
a doorway, or be prepared to do things that the 
rest of us, from the stand point of our own 
protection, can do and they can't do? How do 
they deal with that? 
Secondly, I was very happy that the fire 
station itself had been earthquake-proofed as a 
part of the early disaster preparedness. Water 
heaters were all strapped down, oxygen bottles 
were strapped down, things-bookshelves, 
computers, and things like that were held down 
in place with some preparations the guys had 
done prior to the earthquake. And so, one door 
stuck, and that was the only thing that we really 
had go wrong with our building itself. Some 
telephone lines dropped, and the guys were able 
to pull them out of the way without hazard. They 
got the equipment out, and then it was ready to 
go to work. 
Everybody was in that state of shock which 
you tend to get in when a disaster occurs. It's like 
an eerie feeling, like uNow what do we do?" And 
instincts took over. I looked across the city, and I 
could see the dust rising from Main Street and the 
columns of smoke beginning to develop 
throughout the city. 
And in our disaster plan, we had set priorities 
for response. Our first priority is to respond to the 
most life-threatening fire and deal with the fire 
situations first; secondly, hazardous materials, 
because, in our minds, there's only one 
department that really can handle those two 
things, with the tools and equipment and the 
personnel that we have, and if they aren't 
handled, they lead to much worse situations, left 
untouched. 
Rescue and medical emergencies-medical 
emergencies and rescue actually are our third and 
fourth priorities, medical emergencies because 
they can be life-threatening and obviously need 
but there's a lot 
available to deal with that, once they get their 
heads about themselves. 
And in this case, Salud Para La 
downtown area, set up a field clinic in 
and treated a number of the victims that 
were injured the earthquake. 
I only wish we had had coordinated that prior 
to the disaster so we would have had a better 
handle on the capabilities our community had in 
dealing with those kinds of issues. 
There was a tremendous pull on the part of 
the emergency responders to want to stop and 
help these people. I mean, they were-the engines 
were being-people were trying to stop them 
because there were injured people in the streets, 
and this was their only sign of help, but they had 
to keep the priority in mind, in that the fires were 
still going. And some of our younger firefighters 
had a real difficult time dealing with that, as 
they watched people watching the engine go by, 
without them being able to stop and help. 
Once they got to the fires-it seems like we 
should have prepared for this, and maybe 
subconsciously, we had, but physically we 
hadn't--once we got on the scene of the fires, our 
water system was gone. And the worst areas 
where you're going to have the majority of fires is 
also where your worst enemy is from an 
earthquake, it's going to take the water system. 
And you've got to compile all those worst-case 
situations into an agenda that we can plan 
around for the future. 
Gary Smith, Chief 
Watsonville Fire Department 
Emergency Services Director 
Even though this earthquake was not 
catastrophic and required only minimal 
resource support from State and federal 
agencies, State and federal response systems 
were activated to provide assistance as 
necessary. Each affected jurisdiction activated its 
Emergency Operations Center and responded 
with its own resources, supplemented by 
regional and State mutual aid assistance. As in 
previous earthquakes, spontaneous volunteer 
actions were a crucial element of local response. 
Individual efforts in search and rescue, 
firefighting, first aid, and traffic control saved 
many lives in the first critical hours after the 
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, .... 1uaAc. ucu.:;uu•y speaking local emergency 
responses were effective in further 
losses of life and property, but the Lorna Prieta 
earthquake should not be considered a good test 
of this capability. 
It is important to recognize there are some 
emergency response systems that worked 
effectively on October 17th which could easily be 
overwhelmed in an even slightly larger event, or 
in an earthquake in which the epicenter was 
closer to heavily populated areas, or in which the 
strong ground motion lasted just a few more 
seconds. 
Richard Andrews 
Chief Deputy Director (now Director) 
Governor's Office of Emergency Services 
SITUATION STATUS INFORMATION 
A recurrent theme in the testimony was that 
the lack of timely official information about the 
situation status hampered effective op~rations 
in the hardest hit areas of Los Gatos, Santa Cruz, 
and especially Watsonville. Initially, the media 
were the only source of information, and in the 
several hours immediately after the earthquake, 
the media focused almost exclusively on the 
dramatic Cypress viaduct and Bay Bridge failures 
and the San Francisco Marina district fire. These 
isolated incident reports gave the impression 
there was terrible, damage 
throughout the Bay Area. Consequently, several 
key emergency response officials felt they were 
"on their own," them to make no 
for much-needed outside help. In 
several cases the media themselves were 
confused. 
It wasn't 
no idea we'd been hit. We assumed at that 
vm'nc--n~auv until about eleven o'clock that 
that we were on our own, that 
had no anyone. We 
Area was hit 
as were. the media was 
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oro'Vtatn5[ information about us to our 
cmnn1w1!itv and vice versa. 
Deborah Acosta 
Town Manager 
Town of Los Gatos 
As far as finding out what was going on, we 
were in the same void. When the quake hit, our 
station was thrown out of power also, and there 
was no communication phonewise with the 
assignment desk, but we did have two-way radio. 
And from what I heard from the assignment 
editors on the scene, they didn't have any 
information from offidals. They couldn't get 
through to lines at the police department, the fire 
department, or any of that, so they were relying 
on us for what we saw and was able to give back 
to them. 
Mark Richardson 
KTVU Channel 20 
Oakland 
STATE MUTUAL AID SYSTEM RESPONSE 
In response to local approximately 
of fire equipment, including three 
rescue vehicles, were sent through the 
OES fire mutual aid system, and an equivalent 
number through the California Division of 
~<nr.<><:h-u and Fire Protection were dispatched to 
earthquake-related incidents. The law 
enforcement mutual aid system provided a 
variety of resources, including approximately 
175 personnel and 32 search dog teams. The 
coroners' mutual aid 22 
coroners to Alameda County 
deal with St. structure 
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application of the newly developed Procedures 
for Post-Earthquake Safety Evaluation of Buildings, 
developed by the Applied Technology Council 
under contract with OES and the Office of 
Statewide Health Planning and Development 
(OSHPD). Development of this manual was 
partially funded by FEMA. These procedures had 
been published only one month prior to the 
Lorna Prieta earthquake, and training in their 
use had only started. 
Also for the first time in a California disaster, 
State medical and health mutual aid assistance 
was activated. The Emergency Medical Services 
Authority and the Department of Health 
Services filled medical/health supply and 
personnel requests from Santa Cruz County. 
Emergency Medical Services personnel, trained 
in Critical Incident Stress Debriefing, were also 
recruited from unaffected regions of the State to 
provide mental health services to earthquake 
responders. There was also informal mutual aid 
from volunteer professionals including mental 
health practitioners, building inspectors, and 
attorney members of local bar associations. 
SEARCH AND RESCUE 
Search and rescue efforts following the Lorna 
Prieta earthquake were confined primarily to 
three sites: the I-880 Cypress St. viaduct collapse 
in Oakland, the San Francisco Marina district 
building collapses, and the Pacific Garden Mall 
URM collapses in the City of Santa Cruz. At all 
sites, the initial rescues were made by on-scene 
volunteers. 
FIRES 
Fire departments throughout the impacted 
areas experienced difficulties due to broken 
water mains and electrical power loss. 
Fortunately, the total number of postearthquake 
fires was limited, and all were brought under 
control within a few hours after the earthquake. 
Extremely favorable, unusually light wind 
conditions aided firefighters' efforts to prevent 
conflagrations. 
The greatest number of fires was reported in 
San Francisco, where 27 structure fires occurred 
in a variety of locations, with the most serious 
being in the Marina district. Redundancy in 
water delivery systems, which has been a major 
focus of San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD) 
earthquake-response planning, paid off in this 
event. Breaks in both the municipal water 
system and the high volume auxiliary water 
system inhibited initial firefighting efforts 
causing SFFD to resort to other backup systems. 
Water was drafted from the Palace of Fine Arts 
Lagoon and relayed to the site. Within an hour 
after the earthquake, the SFFD portable water 
supply system was activated, with the Fireboat 
Phoenix pumping water from the Marina 
Lagoon. The fire was brought under control 
within three hours, and the quick response of 
volunteers who assisted in carrying and using 
fire hoses until support arrived is credited with 
preventing further spread of the fire. SFFD 
recalled 300 off-duty firefighters immediately 
following the earthquake, some of which were 
transported by helicopter under agreements 
made previously. 
Several small structure fires were reported in 
Oakland but were brought quickly under 
controL There were also several fires associated 
with the 1-880 Cypress Street viaduct collapse. A 
major fire in Berkeley-originally reported by 
the media to involve the public library-
occurred at a towing service garage. It required 
all the resources of the Berkeley Fire Department 
to bring this fire under control. 
Santa Cruz County reported over twenty 
fires, with only one reported in the City of Santa 
Cruz-that totally destroyed a single family 
residence. Watsonville reported three structure 
fires-one involved a single family residence, 
and the others destroyed two mobile homes. 
These fires are believed to have started because 
gas lines were severed when the homes slid from 
their pre-earthquake locations. Due to water 
main breaks, the Watsonville Fire Department 
experienced difficulty in fighting these fires. The 
department had no water tankers or water pools 
20 
to draft from. Fire control was achieved 
plotting locations of gas-fed fires and requesting 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company to do 
emergency shut-offs. In the Redwood Estates 
area of Santa Clara County, a residence fire was 
ignited by a ruptured propane tank. Because the 
community's entire water distribution system 
was destroyed, the fire was fought by drafting 
water from the community swimming pool. 
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
The only major hazardous materials spill was 
at the UNOCAL oil refinery, involving 840,000 
gallons of unleaded gasoline. This spill was 
quickly handled by UNOCAL with assistance of 
the Richmond Fire Department, the Coast 
Guard Marine Safety Office, and Coast Guard 
Strike Teams. Another smaller spill at the Kelly 
Moore facility in San Mateo County involved 
100,000 gallons of latex paint, which spilled 
into San Francisco Bay. Sloshing of the contents 
of open vessels caused several hazardous-
materials incidents, but secondary containment 
prevented materials from escaping to the 
environment. 
COMMUNICATIONS 
The event of this quake underscored several 
important factors that are known to emergency 
services personnel and planners. And of them, 
number one, when the quake struck, water mains 
broke, gas mains broke, fires occurred, buildings 
collapsed, people were trapped in buildings by-
and struck by falling debris on the streets, 
emergency agencies were swamped with calls, 
and emergency communications systems in effect 
broke down due to overload, and the coordination 
between the agencies and utilities during the 
event, because it became so overwhelming, 
became fragmented. 
Frank Blackburn 
San Francisco Fire Department 
LOMA PRIETA'S CALL TO ACflON 
The telephone communications system in 
the Bay Region sustained little damage, but 
emergency measures taken to control line load 
affected emergency communications. To 
prevent damage to the system from overload the 
telephone companies block incoming calls, thus 
reserving more service for outgoing calls. 
Because the disaster area involved more than 
one area code, it was extremely difficult for the 
OES Region 2 office in Pleasant Hill to 
communicate by telephone with heavily 
impacted jurisdictions in the southern counties, 
especially Santa Cruz. 
Back-up emergency communications systems 
functioned quite well in filling the short-falls of 
the telephone system, although individuals 
assigned to monitor several telephone lines, as 
well as radio receivers, could not physically 
respond to all incoming communication 
attempts. 
Although California response agencies own a 
rather limited number of cellular telephones, 
the cellular phone system was partially effective 
in supplementing field communications. In the 
days following the earthquake however, Cellular 
One, a cellular telephone company, donated 
200 portable battery-powered cellular 
telephones to emergency response personnel for 
unlimited free usage. The principal problem in 
using the telephones was saturation of the cell 
when more than a dozen telephones were in use 
in one place (e.g., the Cypress St. viaduct 
collapse). 
EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION 
One of the other things we learned was about 
the media-they're going to be a key player in 
actually responding to an event. We've realized 
that we have to get the news out, especially if it's 
good news. Good news wasn't coming out very 
clearly. 
Thomas Mounts 
Emergency Preparedness Officer 
City of San jose 
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As in an like Lorna 
local television and radio stations focused 
primarily on covering the event, rather than on 
providing emergency public information. In 
addition, the broadcasts painted an uneven 
picture of the location and extent of earthquake 
damage. Emergency public information 
activities following the earthquake were more 
responses to inquiries by the media than as use 
of the media to communicate important 
information to those persons inside and outside 
the impacted area. 
The Lorna Prieta earthquake disaster 
immediately attracted the attention of 
worldwide news media that were present in the 
Bay Area for the World Series. Local and State 
agencies in the affected areas dealt with on-site 
media who flocked to the various damage and 
emergency operation center locations. The State 
Office of Emergency Services (OES) activated its 
Emergency News Center, which was staffed 
around the dock throughout the response phase 
by nearly SO public information officers from 
various State agencies, under the direction of 
OES. 
Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
In formulating recommendations based on 
the Lorna Prieta earthquake the 
Commission reviewed the range of actions 
suggested by the many local officials who 
testified before the Commission. The 
suggestions include ways to reduce the 
destruction in future and ways to 
deal with immediate nnch>:>Tt 
service demands. These recommendations are 
coupled with more conclusions of the 
Commission's committee on emergency 
response. 
after the Whittier Narrows 
.,.--"·-~,theErrlerJ~rlcy 
va;nu•u y not adequately prepared for these 
exJ>ected events. The committee outlined major 
actions to be undertaken immediately to help 
remedy an emergency response shortfall that, 
unless met would increase the impact of a 
devastating disaster. 
EARTHQUAKE HAZARD MITIGATION 
Voluntary hazard mitigation is limited by 
several factors; but primarily by personal risk 
denial, and competition for scarce funding 
resources. The Commission supports many of 
the recommendations made at the hearings and 
in other forums. Generally, the officials who 
testified recommended the following types of 
activities: 
• Public education about earthquake risks, 
methods of hazard reduction, and 
preparation of households for emergency 
response and short-term relief 
• Development of earthquake-resistant 
construction techniques, and codes and 
standards for upgrading existing buildings 
• Extension of seismic retrofitting 
re<IUirerneJrus to all structures, including 
homes built before seismic safety codes 
were enacted 
• Requiring mobile homes to be braced to 
resist seismic forces 
• Identification of areas of high earthquake 
risk for zoning and permitting processes 
• Development of policies to mitigate 
vu•.cwuar damage to essential and high 
occupancy facilities in high risk areas 
officials from the three 
communities where homeowners sustained 
much to older homes 
the State to 
where mobile homes were most 
uaAu"''''"""' recommended that the state 
often 
gas 
fires. 
IMMEDIATE AND SHORT-TERM 
RESPONSE NEEDS 
Local officials caught up in survival response 
cannot be expected to give the State immediate 
assessments of the total picture or make precise 
requests for equipment and personnel. 
Consequently, the State OES should be 
authorized to send resources to the areas 
impacted by an earthquake automatically and 
without delay. We already know there are sure 
to be immediate demands for fire engines, water 
tenders, portable water mains, rescue 
equipment, and many emergency response 
personnel. 
The State should also require a minimum 
number of routine emergency response 
exercises, with State participation and review. In 
several cases, communities reported that recent 
practice with their plans, as well as the August 
1989 State/federal Response '89 exercise, made a 
very positive contribution to effective and 
timely response immediately after the Lorna 
Prieta earthquake. 
Several officials reported that the ATC-20 
rapid damage assessment method and OES's 
volunteer inspector program were very 
important and helpful. At the same time, 
however, needed improvements in the method 
and the program were suggested. A system for 
accurately posting damaged buildings is needed, 
capable of using all appropriate languages. The 
system should be universally adopted and 
qualified persons, including out-of-town 
inspectors and structural engineers, should be 
trained in the inspection and posting 
procedures, to reduce inconsistencies and 
confusion. The posting forms should be easy to 
use and structured for compatibility with 
computer data management systems. 
The State should guidance on 
procedures to inform building owners and 
tenants of options for access to damaged 
buildings. Procedures for obtaining inventories 
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rlPVPilnriPrl in 
consultation with local emergency services 
annn1P'\ro: State and FEMA 
Recommendations by the ErrterlgerKy 
Planning and Response Committee of the 
Seismic Safety Commission are summarized 
below under five headings: emergency 
management system; communications; mass 
care and shelter; medical services; and training. 4 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
There is an urgent need to enhance, expand 
and improve California's current Emergency 
Management System. The system should be 
standardized, integrated, understood and 
accepted. It must be organized from cities to 
counties to State Regions, and finally to the 
State Operations Center and state agencies. It 
should consist of existing, functioning day-to-
day organizations. Parts of this system are 
currently in place and functioning with 
differing degrees of standardization and 
effectiveness. To accomplish this, several 
recommendations are suggested, as follows. 
• Emergency Management Operational Area 
Organizations should be mandated and 
implemented for all cities, counties, and 
State Regions. 
• OES should conduct an extensive training 
program in the concept, organization, 
functions and operating procedures of 
Emergency Management Operational 
Areas to help develop a standardized 
Emergency Management System for all 
California governmental emergency 
organizations. 
• The Governor's Office of Errterj~ertcy 
Services (OES) should encourage all 
counties and Operational Areas to enter 
into statewide mutual aid 
4 From "Earthquake Emergency Preparedness and 
Response: A Report to the Seismic Safety 
Commission." Emergency Planning and Res,poJase 
Committee Report, October 17, 1990. 
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communicated back the emergency 
" 
disaster 
emergency u"u"'&~··"'~' 
administrative mutual aid. survivable communications. 
MASS CARE AND SHELTER 
COMMlJNICA TIONS 
Additional 
into the process of for and 
emergency care and shelter. For needed 
advances in mass care and 
the recommendations are made. 
.. between state and local 
" 
LOMA PRIETA'S CALL TO ACfiON 
EARTHQUAKE EFFECTS AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
program. 
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Overview of the Recovery 
Process 
Although earthquake recovery involves all 
sectors of a community, local governments have 
the major responsibility of managing 
postearthquake recovery and reconstruction, an 
overwhelming and unanticipated burden. An 
earthquake changes a community's agenda and 
priorities for several years, and local decision-
making is often constrained by the regulatory 
limitations of disaster assistance programs. 
The most difficult issues emerge when the 
initial emergency period is over. While they 
resemble many that local officials deal with 
regularly--e.g., economic land 
use, housing, and ~~U~,,u,., 
standards-the environment is radically 
different. Public concerns and eagerness 
to return to normal quickly push the process 
and may limit the time available for decisions, 
but this can still be slow and drawn-
out. 
It is commonly that rebuilding after a 
major earthquake falls into three or four 
(1) The first month is generally devoted to 
damage assessment, clearance, very 
temporary and emergency or 
repairs. (2) The remainder of the first year 
largely involves demolition, nrr'""'"''n'a 
temporary and facilities for dislocated 
and making more extensive 
of minor damage and of infrastructure 
and public facilities. It then takes two to four 
or more years to 
reconstruction tm)iects 
housing and other Some observers 
say that it can take up to ten years for a 
community to recovery that is to arrive to 
Chapter 3 
eco ery Issue 
the level of vitality it would have if the 
disaster had not occurred. 
In light of this pattern, it should not be 
surprising that the reconstruction process had 
barely begun, 20 months after the Lorna Prieta 
earthquake. For instance, of the 34 buildings 
demolished in downtown Santa Cruz, one had 
been replaced. In downtown Watsonville, none 
of the 22 demolished or severely damaged and 
unoccupiable buildings had reopened or been 
replaced. In Oakland, 450 very-low-income 
victims were still housed in what amounts to 
temporary shelters. Any complete study of Lorna 
Prieta earthquake recovery and reconstruction 
will therefore need to follow the process for a 
few more years. There may be 
lessons from this which the 
Commission should continue to observe. Several 
issues have already and can 
be articulated now. The dominant issue is 
housing. 
Housing Replacement 
It has often been observed that disasters tend 
to and speed up the development of, 
ongoing social and economic trends in a 
community or region. This 
dramatically exposed this '"u"'"'"-r 
the ugly of the low-cost 
in the greater San Francisco Bay Area. 
A recent Association of Bay Area 
Governments indicates there is a 
low income unit shortage in the area. 
Currently there are 15,000 people on an 
Oakland housing waiting and of the 
very low income persons that do have 
of them are well over 
RECOVERY ISSUES 
of their income for rent. 
The IOV'<-oost uuu:>1u:>:. 
income persons live in the state's 
vulnerable The 
housing situation in Santa Cruz 
microcosm of the regional problem for 
vulnerable housing. The problems revealed by 
this earthquake dramatically underscore what 
should be expected when the major urban 
earthquakes occur in California. The following 
testimony of Luther Perry (Santa Cruz County 
Housing Task Force) illustrates these points. 
Our best estimate is that we have something 
on the order of 3,000 people without homes. To 
give you a sense of how that might look 
percentagewise, those destroyed and major-
damaged housing units correspond to about 3-
1/2 percent of our entire housing stock. 
In the Cities of Santa Cruz, Capitola, and 
Scotts Valley, the housing loss was relatively less, 
approximately one percent of their housing stock. 
In the City of Watsonville, it was about 8 
percent, and in the unincorporated part of the 
county, where there was a wide variation, the 
average was about 4 percent. 
Now, numbers like 1 and 4, and even 8 
percent of housing stock, are not-they're not real 
big numbers until you put a little bit more 
perspective on it. In all parts of the county, our 
typical apartment and house vacancy rates, 
before the earthquake, were in the vicinity of one 
percent. What that means is, in the Cities of 
Santa Cruz, Scotts Valley, and Capitola, the 
number of dwelling units that are out of service is 
approximately the same as the entire pre-
earthquake vacancy rate. 
And, of course, there's not an even match 
between houses that are lost and ones that are 
available that are vacant. 
In the City of Watsonville, the number of 
dwelling units off-line, the number of families 
out in the cold, represents something like 800 
percent of the vacancy factor in that town. That 
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every 
vacant unit. 
The stories that 
two and three to a people 
in garages, that is very strongly true in the 
Watsonville area, and it is those buildings that 
took the heaviest damage. So, retrofit on older 
frame structures is a significant issue, and 
Watsonville demonstrates that in spades. 
Also, over half of the mobile homes that are 
off their foundations are in the Watsonville area. 
In most of these cases, the mobile homes are off 
their foundation so spectacularly that it's 
interrupted the utility service and has supports 
sticking through the floors of mobile homes. Yet 
people continue to attempt to occupy those, 
because they would rather live there than have to 
go into a tent or out into the cold. 
I don't know what kind of magic to offer, but 
if there are procedures or approaches or 
construction practices that keep mobile homes 
from being thrown off their foundations, that 
would be 500 units of housing, right there, that 
had significant to major damage-we could be 
saving a lot of grief for a lot of people, and 
particularly for a very vulnerable population, the 
elderly population. 
The second major problem are those 
downtown, single-room-occupancy (SRO) hotels 
in Santa Cruz. Like almost every city in this 
state, those are older hotels-they're no longer 
economical for other purposes, and they're 
converted over for single-room occupancy, either 
among people who are one step above being street 
folks, or for older people who not only are on 
limited income, they're on poverty income. 
So, we have 400 people who, just like that, 
they have no place to live, the buildings are in the 
fenced-off areas, red-tagged. These are primarily 
elderly people, impaired folks, or people who have 
a history of mental or alcohol type problems. 
They were living in a stable situation, and now 
suddenly they're out on their ears. 
I think there's a lesson here, that when you 
have a very strong earthquake and you are as 
close to the epicenter as we were here-the loss of 
housing units is indeed very much larger than 
anyone had led one to believe would be the case. 
"""'...,'"''C.'""''""""'"' OF ASSISTANCE TO 
REPLACE LOST HOUSING 
the 
the 
of the federal response 
and Hurricane Of 
the GAO's 
is a summary of the GAO's 
based on the GAO's 
Disaster Assistance: and local 
"'"j"""'"·"' to Natural Disasters Need 
1991). 
to the GAO study, the Lorna Prieta 
was the first disaster in a 
urban area where the problem of 
or replacing low-income uuu~•ux 
occurred. The Lorna Prieta earthquake struck an 
area that had a serious shortage of affordable 
rental housing for low-income and a 
low vacancy rate for all housing.6 According to 
5 HUD defines affordable rent as not more than 30 
percent of income for someone with 80 percent of the 
median income of the area, adjusted for family size. 
6 HUD considers vacancy rates below 5 percent (4 to 6 
percent, depending on the rate of growth in the area) 
to be low. In areas hardest hit by the earthquake-
Alameda, San Francisco, and Santa Cruz counties-
housing ..... ""'"''""r 
believe it had the authority to direct HUD to do 
so, and HUD did not agree to assume the 
.n.u.uu•uxu section 402 of the 
Stafford Act authorizes FEMA direct federal 
disaster funds. 
In 1990, HUD Region IX officials 
proposed using (1) $44 million in federal funds 
to help rebuild damaged or demolished housing 
and (2) 2,000 5-year rental assistance vouchers 
to aid victims while the housing was 
rebuilt. However, HUD headquarters did not 
fund this proposal. HUD allocated 500 rental 
assistance vouchers and 664 moderate 
rehabilitation certificates to the earthquake 
disaster area. It took 4 months to provide the 
vouchers, and local authorities in one locality 
vacancy rates prior to the earthquake ranged from 0.8 
to 2.9 percent. 
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HOUSING REPLACEMENT 
on progress the federal 
uu•~u5in the 
nA>'Y~mr recommendations. 
that the Director of FEMA should coordinate 
with the of HUD and other 
and 
recovery plan for low-income victims. The 
second is that the should either 
clarify whether section 402 of the Stafford Act 
authorizes FEMA to direct HUD to assist state 
and local governments in rehabilitating or 
reconstructing housing for disaster victims or (2) 
amend sections of the United States Housing Act 
of 1937 and the Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1974 to provide for 
appropriations directly to HUD to fund housing 
assistance for disaster victims. 
Answers to these questions will provide the 
framework within which California can launch 
its own planning process to deal with this 
difficult issue. 
u"~'"'"'" warrant attention now. 
The Commission's for 
communities' abilities to manage the recovery 
process from urban include 
and Federal disaster assistance provisions 
and delivery. The application processes 
and eligibility criteria for disaster 
assistance programs need to be simplified 
and streamlined to expedite assistance to 
victims. 
• We need to know more about the effects 
of recovery process on regional economies 
and governments' fiscal health 
• We need to know how to create and 
maintain the sociopolitical climate that 
will contribute to effective recovery 
management. 
Resolution of these and other issues that will 
emerge as communities continue their recovery 
is a matter of statewide interest. Developing 
practical methods and approaches to resolve 
these issues are integral to both implementing 
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local planning efforts and to development of the 
State plan for earthquake recovery. 
STATE RECOVERY PLANNING 
The Lorna Prieta earthquake highlighted the 
disruption encountered when damage to public 
buildings and facilities leads to temporary and 
long-term closure. The State and its agencies 
and institutions must now begin preparing 
plans for their own temporary relief and longer-
term recovery in order to minimize the level of 
postearthquake social and economic disruption 
both to the communities where state facilities 
are concentrated and to the state's employees, 
clients and university students. 
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Chapter 4 
Costs and Funding 
Introduction 
The Lorna Prieta earthquake resulted in 
approximately $8.0 billion in damage to 
buildings, building contents, infrastructure, and 
other direct costs. Indirect economic losses from 
the earthquake are poorly defined, but they 
appear to have cost approximately $2 billion 
dollars. In total, the Lorna Prieta earthquake was 
approximately a $10 billion event which 
corresponds to about $1700 per person for the 
six million people in the ten county affected 
area. The $10 billion dwarfs the economic 
impact of other US earthquakes, but is still a 
factor of five to ten smaller than the economic 
impact expected for large earthquakes in major 
urban areas. [Based on a 1980 FEMA memo, 
adjusted for inflation, a M 6.5 on the 
Inglewood-Newport fault would cause $112 
billion in damage.] 
This section describes the costs and recovery 
funding sources for the Lorna Prieta earthquake. 
An overview of the economic impacts of the 
earthquake is also presented. Data are primarily 
available on a regional basis and these are 
augmented, where possible, by local and 
anecdotal information where such data are 
helpful in providing for a fuller understanding 
of the economic impacts of the earthquake. 
Primary data were not collected; rather, existing 
information was compiled and analyzed. 
Earthquake damage and loss estimates must 
be interpreted with caution. No agency has the 
responsibility to compile comprehensive 
damage and loss information on a consistent 
basis after an earthquake. Rather, a variety of 
organizations each compiles fragmentary 
information based on their own programs and 
needs. Consequently, there is no well-
established process by which comprehensive 
damage and loss information is systematically 
collected after an earthquake. Firm estimates 
from engineering studies may be combined with 
rough guesses about approximate damage levels. 
Criteria for assessing damages and assigning 
values to losses vary widely. There are no 
uniform standards for the repair of damaged 
structures which makes it hard to estimate total 
repair costs. Compilations of damages may be 
incomplete in some cases and double counted 
in others. 
Damage is defined here as the direct cost to 
repair or replace buildings, building contents, 
and infrastructure damaged by the earthquake. 
In general, data about damages to public 
facilities are more complete and reliable because 
there is a public accounting of governmental 
costs. Private sector damage data-from 
individuals, to small businesses, to large 
corporations-are subject to larger uncertainties. 
The complete reconstruction process-from 
engineering analysis, to planning, to financing, 
and to completing construction-may take 
several years to a decade or more after a major 
earthquake. Therefore, it may be many years 
before the costs of replacing facilities that were 
damaged or destroyed in the Lorna Prieta 
earthquake are fully known. 
Other direct earthquake costs include such 
things as removal of debris, security in damaged 
areas, disaster response and management 
expenses, medical costs, and the dollar cost of 
loss of life. Accounting for some direct 
earthquake costs is sometimes commingled with 
"normal" operations, and thus estimates of the 
extra costs generated by an earthquake are 
sometimes difficult or impossible to obtain, 
particularly for the private sector. 
Indirect earthquake losses include costs 
associated with such things as business 
estimates are crude and are 
limitations and sp~:~citic 
Funding for recovery after an 
comes from a wide variety of sources, including 
federal, state, and local governments, voluntary 
organizations, and the individuals, businesses 
and other organizations affected by the 
earthquake. Public-sector recovery funding data 
are generally much more precise than damage 
and loss data, because such funding is formally 
appropriated, and detailed accounting of 
expenditures is generally available. Private-
sector recovery funding data are sparse, except 
for selected nonprofit organizations. 
The following compilation and discussion of 
economic losses and recovery funding 
associated with the Lorna Prieta earthquake first 
reviews damage and other direct losses, followed 
by reviews of indirect losses, and sources of 
recovery funding. 
Direct Losses 
The California Office of Emergency Services 
(OES) has compiled damage assessments 
reported by the affected counties for both 
private and public facilities. The assessments 
were conducted within two months of the 
earthquake and they have not been 
systematically updated since that time. OES now 
tracks information it needs on a case-by-case 
basis. The total damage to public and private 
facilities federal-aid eligible 
and was estimated as $5.94 billion 
1990a). Of this 
billion is 
billion is 
million is in undetermined miscellaneous 
costs due 
<U~UH''-"t gas, 
and water waste water 
and telecommunications facilities are poorly 
defined. at and harbor facilities 
may have been as much as $200 million (SOR, 
1989). Reconstruction, restoration and recovery 
of the gas and electric utility systems may total 
about $100 million (PG&E, 1989). Total damage 
to infrastructure, other than highways and 
bridges may total approximately $0.5 billion. At 
least some of this damage is included in the OES 
compilation discussed above, although some of 
the reporting counties appear to have used 
incomplete and/or noncomparable criteria for 
including/ excluding certain facilities in their 
damage reports. 
In addition to building and infrastructure 
damage, the Lorna Prieta earthquake also 
resulted in other direct costs for debris removal, 
protective measures in damaged areas, and a 
host of other response and recovery costs. For 
the public sector, estimates of debris removal 
and protective measures total $103 million 
(FEMA, 1991). No estimates of such costs are 
available for the private sector. It appears that 
direct costs other than damage probably exceed 
$200 million. 
The Lorna Prieta earthquake resulted in 62 or 
63 deaths and 3757 reported injuries (OES 
1990a). Based on a statistical value of $1.7 
million for a human life (Keech, 1989) and 
roughly estimating the value of injuries at 
$10,000 each, the direct human/medical costs of 
the earthquake may have been approximately 
$150 million. the total direct costs of the 
other than damage to buildings, 
contents, and exceeded 
$350 million. 
To examine ~"'""t>'­
sector, there are two additional 
sources, other than the OES estimates: insurance 
settlements and value assessments for 
nrr""l&>Th7 tax reduction purposes. to 
the California of Insurance 
insured losses from the Lorna Prieta 

and other losses such as Route 17 in the 
Santa Cruz mountains and the Embarcadero 
];'"""""''"" in San had 
effects that affected tr:.nc:•vwt:~tiinn 
the area. If one million commuters were 
one hour in each and the 
average value of their time is $10 per then 
such delays resulted in indirect 
losses of million per day. Given that the 
was closed for a month and other 
a 
reasonable estimate of indirect losses due 
must be in the range $1 
billion or more. 
least short-term on tourism and 
occupancy hard-hit areas such 
and San Francisco. Air travel 
related taxes, reduced assessments due to 
accurate estimates of the 
l>"''"''"'' very difficult to obtain. 
"'"'"""""''"" values reduced property tax 
about $4.6 
Total business losses from the 
reduced San Francisco's tax revenues 
about $15 million in with an 
additional loss of million in taxes 
from buildings demolished or declared 
uninhabitable In 
in revenues from hotel taxes and about $20 
million in sales taxes from tourists. Tax losses to 
the for tourism-related activities may have 
been in the range of $10 from Lorna 
Prieta 
At least short-term nn,df•:!T"Cht111:' 
estimate. 
residents and businesses 
the Federal Reserve Bank to be ~v>i·u'~'"'" 
billion ,. . ., ..... ," 
disaster recovery 
total between billion. 
of the 
Lorna Prieta appears to be more 
the affected area prc1ba!blV 
recovery costs ''"""H-'""" 
significantly more than the Federal 
Reserve Bank's estimate. 
FEDERAL PROGRAMS 
seven after the Lorna Prieta 
the United States ~o:mness 
$2.85 billion in 
SBA disaster loans 
years. 
STATE PROGRAMS 
due to various 
periods, late and earned interest on 
funds to be allocated (Board of Equalization, 
1991). 
In April 1991 the California Department of 
Finance issued a status report of funding. This 
information is synthesized in Table 4-1. 
PRIVATE PROGRAMS 
Private sector expenditures in response to the 
Lorna Prieta earthquake included various types 
of insurance, a wide range of efforts by 
voluntary organizations and, finally, 
expenditures by individuals and companies 
affected by the earthquake. As discussed above, 
total insurance payments were approximately 
$681 million; this total will undoubtedly go 
somewhat higher as remaining claims are settled 
through negotiation or litigation. 
A wide range of volunteers responded to the 
Lorna Prieta earthquake. In the hours 
immediately after the earthquake, volunteers 
played important roles in search and rescue 
operations. During the relief and recovery 
processes, thousands of volunteers and dozens 
of voluntary organizations provided various 
kinds of assistance to individuals and 
organizations affected by the earthquake. 
The American Red Cross collected donations 
from throughout the world and over $78 
million were designated by donors for use in 
relief of Lorna Prieta earthquake victims. This 
large pool of donations is unprecedented and 
probably results from live television coverage of 
the San Francisco Bay World Series which had 
begun just prior to the earthquake. 
As of May 1991, the American Red Cross 
allocated aU donor contributions that were 
~~·"~'>'""''""'"' for this 
LOMA PRIETA'S 
victims in 50 shelters 
in addition to direct cash 
persons for replacement Of basic T\Pl"<:ITn<ll 
property and rental assistance. This program 
also provided services by over 7,000 volunteers 
and nurses, 40 mobile feeding vehicles and 
more than 126,000 nights of shelter (American 
Red Cross, 1991). 
The Red Cross Special Disaster Relief Fund 
has thus far assisted nearly 10,000 people 
through grants made to local agencies in 61 
collaborative projects for transitional and 
permanent housing, mental health, 
employment, and legal and human services. 
With these funds, almost 1,200 housing units 
are being rehabilitated or newly constructed. 
The remaining funds continue to support 
various programs including a Client Advocacy 
Program (serving more than 2,500 families), 
disaster planning, and reserves to meet future 
earthquake-related needs in Northern California 
as identified. 
The Salvation Army had spent $5 million 
within the first 45 days which helped over 
227,000 people, served 100,000 meals and 
provided groceries, clothing, furniture and 
medical supplies to very low income persons 
and families. Uke the American Red Cross, the 
Salvation Army's work with the earthquake 
victims continues with a particular emphasis on 
providing transitional housing in Santa Cruz 
(for older persons) and in Watsonville (for 
families). 
Northern California Grantmakers (1990) 
compiled a list of 57 foundations and 
corporations who contributed more than $19 
million to Lorna Prieta relief nnPT~tnrm<.: 
contributors (above $1 
james Irvine Foundation, Pacific Gas and 
LlC'-"''-• the San Francisco and 
of the Area. The total charitable 
contribution '"'~'u'-''-''11~ thousands of 
volunteered at 
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least $100 million and perhaps significantly 
more. 
Conclusions 
The Lorna Prieta earthquake resulted in about 
$10 billion in direct damage and indirect losses. 
Publicly funded disaster relief and recovery 
program expenditures will total $3 to $4 billion, 
with $6 to $7 billion being absorbed by the 
individuals and organizations (both private and 
public) in affected area. Precise and accurate 
damage and loss figures after an earthquake are 
generally not available. Most comparative data 
from preliminary damage assessments are made 
in the first few days after the event, primarily to 
gage the disaster's magnitude and help qualify 
for state and federal disaster declarations or 
other assistance. These initial estimates are 
refined relatively little thereafter. No 
organization is obligated or has a strong interest 
in continuing to compile generalized, 
comparable damage estimates, and there is no 
central organization responsible for compiling 
and coordinating data about recovery funding. 
Indirect loss estimates are very crude and subject 
to very large uncertainties. Public sector 
recovery funding is fairly well accounted for. 
Except for insurance information however, 
private sector loss and recovery funding data for 
this earthquake are virtually nonexistent. These 
losses can be derived only by estimating the 
difference between total estimated damage and 
losses less public sector recovery funding. 
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TABLE4-1 
Loma Prieta Funding Status Report: April 1991 
ACTIVITY 
EXPENDITURES: 
Transportation 
Develop revised seismic 
standards for earthquake 
resistance to be utilized in 
the design and 
construction of new state 
highways and bridges, 
and for retrofit of existing 
highways and bridges. 
Initial appropriations: $81 
million. 
Emergency public ferry 
and surface transportation 
services. 
Various street and 
highway repairs and 
reconstructions for which 
the state is responsible 
(streets and roads for 
which local governments 
are responsible are 
included in the Local 
Government element of 
this report). Both the 
Federal Highway 
Administration and FEMA 
participate in funding 
these repairs. 
PROGRESS OR STATUS OF 
IMPLEMENT AnON 
Research to develop solutions to 
multicolumn retrofit and to ultimately 
update standards is underway. Twenty 
contracts are in process or near award. 
Sixteen contracts for single-column retrofit 
have been awarded and three more projects 
are advertised. Right-of-way costs are 
included in construction contracts. 
The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) has denied all ferry system 
participation. The Department of 
Transportation (CAL TRANS) is appealing the 
rejection of $3 million in claims previously 
approved. (*NOTE: The state's funding of 
this program is from various transportation 
funds. It is not anticipated at this time that 
these costs will be reimbursed from the 
Disaster Relief Fund.) 
Caltrans has prepared a comprehensive list 
of all projects (approved, pending, and 
denied). Essentially, the smaller projects are 
completed or underway. The majority of 
roads and highways damaged in the 
earthquake are open and operating 
normally. Some major projects not yet 
funded and/or completed include the 
Cypress Street Viaduct replacement, the 
Embarcadero Viaduct, and the Terminal 
Separation project. 
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TOTAL OBLIGATED/EXPENDED 
(Dollan In Thousands) 
State Federal Total 
5,129 0 5,129 
(research) 
5,082 52,265 57,347 
(construction) 
2,000* 0 2,000 
25,396 288,898 314,294 
COSTS FUNDING 
HOUSING 
Farmworker Housing 
Grant Program for 
rehabilitating farmworker 
housing. Appropriation: 
$1.5 million. 
In most cases, 
administered by 
agencies under guidelines 
1"1''"""'"" .... "'~'~ by the Department of 
and Community Development (HCD). 
Where local governments are participating, 
commitments are made only after 
the governments have completed 
final review and have submitted the 
application to HCD for final approvaL Of 
the 2,1 05 applications submitted to date, 
649 have been received by HCD and 1,294 
are being reviewed by participating local 
governments. The remaining 162 
applications have been denied. It is 
anticipated that approximately 1 00-200 
additional applications will be received. 
Three applications were received and the 
full appropriation was committed 
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0 
1,500 0 1,500 

LOCAL 
$ 
1.9 
.2 
1.1 
1.0 
562 
24 
8 
1,547 
827 
1 0 
79 0 4,179 
Alameda 
Contra Costa 
Marin 
San Francisco 
Santa Clara 
Santa Cruz 
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ACTIVITY 
FEMA in 
various government 
recoveries, including 
facilities, city/county 
roads, emergency 
response costs, etc. The 
state will pay the full 25 
percent share of the 
required local match for 
FEMA funds for this 
disaster. 
PRIVATE NONPROFIT$ 
Specified private 
nonprofit organizations 
eligible for federal and 
state funds. 
PROGRESS OR STATUS OF 
IMPLEMENTATEON 
hundred and eighty-seven applications 
were filed by local government entitles. Of 
this number, 154 were approved for FEMA 
funding and 155 were granted eligibility 
under the state NOM provisions. Many 
unresolved issues remain as evidenced by 
more than 70 active appeals. The largest 
recipients under the federal program are (in 
millions): 
$28.5 San Francisco 
18.4 Oakland 
1 3.9 Santa Cruz County 
9.8 Port of Oakland 
4.8 City of Watsonville 
4.2 City of Santa Cruz 
2.4 Alameda County 
FEMA received 330 applications and 
approved 242. Of these, 126 were also 
approved under the NOM program for 
state funding of the FEMA-required match. 
Changes in both the federal and state 
disaster assistance authorities have resulted 
in private nonprofits becoming the largest 
single applicant pool. To date, the 
Watsonville Community Hospital is the only 
applicant that has exceeded the state cap of 
$5 million per private nonprofit 
organization. Also, payment of state funds 
to all religious organizations has been 
suspended because of the apparent 
prohibition of such payments under the 
state Constitution. The largest state 
and/or federal obligations to date are for 
the following organizations (in millions): 
$39.5 Watsonville Community Hospital 
3.9 Redwood Mutual Water 
Company 
2.7 Stanford University 
1. 7 Mercy High School/San Mateo 
Youth Center 
1.6 Golden Gate University 
1.6 St. Francis Youth Center 
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TOTAl OBUCA TED/EXPENDED 
(Dollars in Thousands) 
State Federal Total 
9,059 58,849 67,908 
COSTS AND FUNDING 
K-1 SCHOOL 
DISTRICTS 
participation is to 
restoration of 
noninstructional facilities 
and is, therefore, much 
smaller. 
INDIVIDUAL 
ASSISTANCE 
Victims of damage to 
Bridge and I 880 
structure. 
n~'''"'"''nr<:: to some 
have 
eligibility and have 
received awards. Applicants are still being 
required to submit additional documenta-
tion, 18 months after the event. In addition, 
USDE is restricting awards to cover repairs 
only to predisaster conditions, without 
consideration of current codes and 
standards; and, no supplemental for 
additional work or increased costs directly 
associated with disaster damage are 
currently being accepted. This could 
increase the commitment from the state to 
fund the necessary work. To date, USDE has 
only committed a total of $6.6 In 
contrast to USDE, FEMA has accepted 
claims from 86 districts and approved 62 to 
date for a total of $3.6 million. 
A total of 409 applications have been 
received, including 149 for death 
and 260 for personal injury and/or property 
damages. Emergency awards totalling $3.6 
million and settlements totalling $35.2 
million have been paid. Two settlement 
conferences have been held and the Board 
has processed 60 of 
the claims submitted. 
'l\1"''"""r of the Program complete: paid. 
period for unemployment 
benefits. 
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ACTWITY PROGRESS OR STATUS OF TOTAL OBUGATED/EXPENDED 
IMPLEMENTATION (Dollan In Thousands) 
State Federal Total 
Individual family grant A total of 38,81 3 claims were received. Of 21,815 36,268 58,083 
program which provides those, 28,376 have been approved, 9,984 
up to $10,400 (75% were denied or withdrawn, and 45 3 were 
federal funding, 25% identified as duplicate claims. Total 
state funding) for persons expenditures for grants are expected to be 
with serious needs and/or approximately $50.3 million ($15.7 million 
necessary expenses state). This includes $4.2 million for the 
resulting from a natural State Supplemental Assistance Program. 
disaster. Should a Costs for administration are an additional 
claimant have qualified $7.8 million ($1.7 federal and $6.1 million 
needs in excess of the state). This program is virtually complete. 
basic grant, the state may Only the appeals filing period, which closes 
provide a supplemental May 6, 1991, remains open. 
grant of up to $10,000. 
FEMA assistance to Of 38,21 3 applications received, 14,086 0 29,919 29,919 
individuals (temporary have been approved and 24,127 were 
housing and shelter) denied or withdrawn. The high rate of 
denial appears to be a result of FEMA's very 
restrictive regulations defining eligibility. 
The program is complete. 
SBA assistance to This is traditionally the largest single 0 306,450 306,450 
individuals (direct program for individual disaster assistance. 
mortgage and personal Of 18,739 applications received, 11,391 
property loans) have been approved, 7,299 have been 
denied or withdrawn, and 49 are pending. 
The program is virtually complete. 
Personal income tax relief. It is estimated a total of $114.9 million in 97,000 0 97,000 
tax relief will be granted by allowing an 
extended period (5 years) for writing off 
losses. 
Total Expenditures/ 
Obligations to Date 364,296 11197,560 1,561,947 
*Less expenditures not 
anticipated for 
reimbursement from the 
Disaster Relief Fund (2,333) (2,333) 
361,963 1,197,560 1,559,523 
Total Expenditures/ Total expended through Apri11991 (many 
Obligations SubJect to obligations remain to be accounted for). 
Federal and Disaster 
Relief Fund 
Reimbursement 
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COSTS AND FUNDING 
ACTIVm 
REVENUES: 
TEMPORARY SALES 
TAX 
Increase the sales tax by 
1/4 cent for 13 months 
(December 1, 1989, 
through December 13, 
1 990) to raise funds 
specifically for Lorna 
Prieta earthquake 
recoveries. 
PROGRESS OR STATUS OF 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Like all California sales taxes in 1 990, the 
amount collected for the Disaster Relief 
Fund was less than originally anticipated. 
Actual receipts are $21.9 million less than 
the original estimate of $785 million. 
Source: California Department of Finance, April 1991 
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TOTAL OBLIGATED/EXPENDED 
(Dollars In Thousands) 
State Federal Total 
763,100 
The State of California and some of the local 
governments hardest hit by the Lorna Prieta 
earthquake have been the subject of tort claims 
alleging wrongdoing by their officials before and 
after the Lorna Prieta earthquake. Private-sector 
owners and tenants of properties, as well as 
third parties, have been parties to litigation 
involving personal injuries, property damage, 
and 63 fatalities related to the trembler. This 
section on the legal issues of the Lorna Prieta 
earthquake provides an overview of the 
allegations, the legal theories, and the defenses 
identified in litigation related to the October 
1989 earthquake. It is not intended to be an 
exhaustive study of liability issues attending 
natural disasters or earthquakes, but, rather, 
serves to illustrate the types of cases, the 
peculiarities of earthquake damages, arguments 
proffered, and dispositions to date. 
Public-Sector Issues 
STATE GOVERNMENT: 1-880 CYPRESS 
STREET VIADUCT & THE OAKLAND-SAN 
FRANCISCO BAY BRIDGE 
A total of 42 people were killed and 108 
injured when the Interstate 880 Cypress Street 
viaduct and a segment of the Oakland-San 
Francisco Bay Bridge collapsed during the Lorna 
Prieta earthquake. 
In November of 1989, the Legislature met in 
special session and determined that to aid the 
victims of the collapse of these two structures it 
was necessary to create a special fund for the 
payment of personal property, personal injury, 
and death claims arising from the disaster. 
Although the liability of both state and local 
Chapter 5 
Legal Issues 
governments is generally controlled by the 
provisions of the California Tort Claims Act, 7 in 
that special session the Legislature also enacted 
Section 997 et seq. of the Government Code to 
compensate victims of the two collapse disasters 
without regard to liability, fault, or 
responsibility, and without the necessity of 
litigation against the State of California or its 
officers or employees. 
This hybrid "no fault" procedure has so far 
proven to be quite successful in processing 
claims and compensating victims of the two 
collapses. However, some claimants' attorneys 
believe there were certain shortcomings, 8 such 
as the absence of direct, supervisory power by 
the judiciary in the appointment of the 
"settlement master." They contend that if the 
duties of the settlement master had been more 
precisely defined, or had he been given the 
power to act as an arbitrator and issue binding 
decisions upon both parties, some cases would 
have settled even sooner. Further, they allege 
that the six month deadline for the resolution 
of claims, originally intended to require speedy 
settlement of claims, has been used to force 
some clients to either accept inadequate 
compensation or to commence traditional tort 
litigation against the State. At least 14 claimants 
have decided to reject the State's settlement 
offers under this extraordinary legislation and 
are pursuing traditional tort litigation, and the 
number of those choosing to litigate their 
claims is expected to grow. 
The overall success of this novel "no fault" 
approach to the Lorna Prieta earthquake may set 
7 See Section 810 et seq. and 900 et seq. of the 
Government Code. 
8 Correspondence from the California Trial Lawyers 
Association commenting on an early draft of this 
report. 
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a precedent for future damaging seismic 
occurrences. However, any final evaluation will 
have to await the termination of the Section 997 
no fault process and the results of subsequent 
tort litigation, if any, related to these structure 
collapses. 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
Some of the cities hardest hit by the Lorna 
Prieta earthquake have also been the subject of 
claims alleging wrongdoing by officials before 
and after the event. The major examples of the 
typical allegations, legal theories and defenses 
raised as a result of the October 1989 earthquake 
follow.9 
Inverse Condemnation. A relatively small 
number of building owners10 have alleged that 
their buildings were demolished by local 
government without good cause, or without 
notice or opportunity for hearing, in violation 
of Article I, Section 19 of the California 
Constitution and/or the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
A second category of owners alleged the same 
theory, claiming that only part of their 
buildings needed to be destroyed and thus total 
destruction constituted an unconstitutional 
taking. 
Some of the inverse condemnation-related 
issues that have arisen in the aftermath of the 
Lorna Prieta earthquake are: 
• Inverse Condemnation Claims by Tenants-
Claims for loss of personal property were 
filed by tenants in retail and office buildings 
demolished after the Lorna Prieta earthquake. 
9 For a broader treatment of this 
Flandrick, Governmental 
Immunities During Emergencies: 
After an Earthquake, submitted to the 
California Cities, Earthquake Recovery Wc;rks:hoo. 
November 9, 1989. 
10 As an the of Hollister had four 
inverse condemnation all of which have been 
settled without resort to triaL 
• Conversion of Personal Property-Some tenants 
claimed it was an unlawful "conversion" 11 
to dispose of their personal property without 
providing them an opportunity to salvage 
personal property after building demolition. 
• Negligent Demolition-There were three 
categories of claims regarding negligent 
demolition arising from the Lorna Prieta 
earthquake: 
1. Owners claiming that only partial 
demolition was needed; 
2. Adjacent property owners claiming that 
their buildings could have been saved 
but for the fact that the adjoining 
building, often with a common wall, was 
removed thereby weakening the 
"undamaged" building; and, 
3. Some owners claiming that their 
undamaged adjacent buildings were 
damaged by negligent removal of debris 
such as dropping debris through the roof 
of the building, or damaging walls or 
foundations with heavy equipment 
while demolishing adjacent buildings. 
• Interference with Economic Advantage or 
Contract-Business proprietors have claimed 
interference with economic advantage and 
interference with the lease contract between 
the tenant and property owner. 
• Conspiracy-Tenants and property owners 
have alleged cities, city officials and/or 
elected officials conspired with state or 
federal agencies to obtain federal money by 
demolishing the property owners' 
buildings.12 
11 The term "conversion" is defined as an 
unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of 
ownership over goods or personal property belonging 
to another, to the alteration of then condition, or the 
exclusion of the owners rights; the unauthorized and 
wrongful exercise of dominion and control over 
another's personal property, to the exclusion of, or 
inconsistent with, the rights of the owner. 
12 In such a claim, the plaintiff must show that there 
was an 'unlawful agreement". taken by cities 
after the declaration of a disaster Governor are 
controlled by the California Act, 
Government Code Section 
to demolish buildings were 
performance of discretionary tuiJLCti!ons 
employees in carrying out the 
the Employee and city are immune 
Government Code Section 8655 
or 
intentional tort, such actions for emotional 
distress are barred. 13 
Because few inverse condemnation 
claims were made in the aftermath of the Lorna 
Prieta and they appear to be 
without resort to as well as the pr<)tracl:ect 
of time it will take to and 
subsequently any claims actually 
litigated, definitive conclusions or insights are 
not available at this There is, 
one previous related claim from the 1983 
that may prove 
inverse 
condemnation claim. 
The only California case, a 
published appellate decision, involving the 
summary demolition of an 
resulted in a decision 
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summary for the 
the Court of found that at least two 
triable issues of fact existed. was there a 
The conclusions of a 
and the State Office of 
"·"''"r<>Pr11rv ·'"''-m''"'" as well as the fact that the 
waited 57 days to demolish the building, 
raised at least an inference that the was 
not a hazard. factual questions were 
raised as to whether the Roses voluntarily 
consented to the destruction of the building by 
the release or whether it was signed 
under the influence of duress and 
misrepresentation. 
The appellate court decision in the Rose case 
teaches: 
1. In an emergency situation involving the 
of its citizens, a city can 
with a due process and 
demolish a building If the 
demolition is challenged, the bears the 
burden to establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence the for immediate 
destruction. 
any doubt exists as to whether the 
is an administrative 
should be held at which the nrr>nt>rhr 
A filed on 
warning all persons 
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an "etnerg;(~n<::v" py,>rnntlnn 
Sect. 21 
if no true emergency 
officials are discretion" under the 
the demolition is and an 
environmental review may have to be 
conducted prior to demolition.l6 (See 
discussion regarding Santa Cruz's L.rAJI"\c-reHJciet 
over demolition of the St. 
Hotel below). 
CEQA-based Lnl!g~n:uJn; 
Hotel Case. A coalition of groups 
a local group, Friends of the St. 
""''"·'"'"''"· the California Preservation 
and the National Trust for Historic vr<•c""'" 
filed a laWSUit tO 7lTP•VPr1t 
'-'";v'"c. Preservation interests decided to 
the demolition h.,.,,.,,,., 
the "'"'!""'''"'"''" 
an imminent 
the contention the mere 
passage of time establishes that an imminent 
threat did not exist. The demolition 
Pnrrn1Pf•n· determinations 
to public safety. 
In an unpublished opinion reviewing the 
trial court's the Court of 
found little probability that 
opponents would on the merits of their 
argument: 
"First the trial court has found dear and 
evidence that the uuuu.lll)<. 
nn~se:nts an imminent threat to the 
health and The evidence of record 
that Therefore 
to follow the 
Demolition Hotel Was 
State Review-Section 5028 of 
note a, p. 5-5, supra. 
and concluded that it 
nn><:Pnt~·rl an imminent threat. 
be done to lessen the threat to ad]iaomt 
structures other than sm·ro1Jn(:Hn 
with fences in the middle of '"''"r••n 
from U<A>CAHCUIO 
successfully further contended that if 
the St. George's owner elected demolition to 
abate the nuisance and the State would not 
allow the municipality could be left 
to abate the nuisance; a structure that "''"~'""'"t"n 
an imminent threat of harm, to 
established statewide (OES) criteria, could not be 
removed. 
Protracted CEQA-based Litigation Would Have 
Caused Disproportionate Injury to the City 
Cruz-Relying on Mills v. County 
(1979) 98 Cai.App.3d 859, 861, the City of Santa 
Cruz successfully contended that a in the 
demolition of the St. while the 
case was further appealed by demolition 
opponents, would cause dis.nr<)n<Jrti 
to the party which 
should issue. The Court of 
Demolition 
Were Minimal-The sole claim 
the 
named as a in an lH=><v''" 
district. The district had been listed 
criteria. 
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more uuu.._, .... a, 
.. was harmful to the property 
owner and tenant; 
of demolition 
" new 
investment in Santa 
• in demolition uc1avcu 
affordable housing; 
" resulted in the loss of revenues to the 
of Santa Cruz; and, 
" in demolition would have caused 
which the 
of the St. 
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structures. Some claimants have 
fashion a which 
found if the trier of fact establishes that 
etc., knew the uu'"'"''""' 
was hazardous and failed to wam "'"!"'""'" 
contained the 
'"'"'"!"''"'"• Tort Claims Act, although such 
immunities are not absolute. the fact 
that cities are not liable for failure to 
for violations or hazards to 
~"''"'""'""''r•t Code Section 818.6), recent 
court decisions have the of 
to collect damages when a known risk 
causes a foreseeable or u"""'o'-
""'""''" the individual 
house was constructed some nine 
The 
ns]oec:tors will also be entitled to immunity 
are found guilty of actual fraud, 
rr>lCTHr>Tlr>Yl Or actual and in SUCh an 
event, the would have no legal 
'"'"·"~">''"'"'" for such a judgment. Although 
aH<eg<lti<ms of corruption and malice are 
simple to include in a complaint, 
difficult proof problems, particular 
when the acts or nonactions took place 
many years previously. Plaintiffs assert the right 
their claims at this late date based on 
~"''"''" rule that the statute of limitations 
does not commence to run on a cause of action 
for fraud until the fraud was reasonably 
and based on their statement that 
did not know of the defective construction 
until the their house. 
As 
any claims 
vt\..~a<u'-- any definitive conclusions or 
in time. 
no. 
geological reports before permit applications 
could be considered. 
The public reaction to the geologic review 
requirement was almost immediate and 
uniformly negative. For most people, concerns 
about geologic hazards ended with the shaking; 
concerns about future hazards from landsliding 
and other types of failure were too remote and 
speculative compared to their immediate 
recovery needs. To be fair, geologists could not 
provide a clear and precise assessment of 
potential hazards in many areas, nor were they 
able to provide assurance of safety. This 
uncertainty greatly diminished the political 
palatability of a geologically cautious approach 
to rebuilding. As of the Spring of 1991, only one 
inverse condemnation-type suit has been filed 
over the rebuilding/permit issue,20 but there 
have been reports of noncompliance and 
rebuilding without geotechnical review or the 
required permits. In addition, one class action 
suit has been filed seeking damages for an 
alleged interference with property rights 
resulting from a County ordinance requirement 
of a recorded Declaration of Geologic Hazard 
which includes: (a) a disclosure of the pendency 
of an areawide geologic study of a potential 
landslide hazard resulting from the Lorna Prieta 
earthquake; (b) a waiver of any claims related to 
the issuance of a damage repair permit; and (c) 
an agreement to hold the County harmless from 
any third party claims relating to the issuance of 
the repair permit. The suit has not (to date) been 
served on the County of Santa Cruz. 
Class Action Litigation for Low Income 
Renters (Smith v. FEMA). Several thousand 
low cost rental units were severely damaged and 
destroyed in the Lorna Prieta earthquake. 
Among these were 2,07021 single room 
20 Olson v. Messier, Santa Cruz Superior Court No. 
113121. 
21 Of these 2,070 units 114 units in Alameda County 
have already been approved by FEMA for funding 
through other means and therefore are not further 
eligibfe for the benefits described herein. Since the 114 
units are not eligible for funding under this 
agreement, that number of units and the 
corresponding number of dollars for each unit are not 
included in the settlement. 
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occupancy (SRO) or equivalent low income 
units that were made uninhabitable by the 
earthquake. These units were located in 
Alameda and Santa Cruz Counties and the City 
and County of San Francisco. Of these 2,070 
units, 388 were in San Francisco, 1,117 units 
were in Alameda and 565 units were in Santa 
Cruz. The denial of assistance to persons 
residing in this lost low-income housing 
resulted in the Smith v. Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) class-action 
litigation that was instituted against FEMA by 
the Legal Aid Society of Alameda County. 
The plaintiffs in Smith v. FEMA were members 
of a class of low-income persons who prior to 
the earthquake were living in single room 
occupancy apartment units and who, following 
the earthquake, applied to FEMA for but were 
denied temporary housing assistance benefits 
under Section 408 of the federal Disaster Relief 
Act (42 U.S.C. Sect. 5174). Plaintiffs were denied 
these benefits on the grounds that either they 
had not resided continuously in the same rental 
unit for at least thirty days prior to the 
earthquake, and thus were deemed to be 
ineligible for benefits under FEMA's 30-day 
continuous residency requirement ("the 30-day 
rule"), or they shared a rental unit with one or 
more other unrelated individuals prior to the 
earthquake, and were denied benefits under 
FEMA's requirement that only one check be 
issued per household (the "shared housing 
rule"). Other plaintiffs in this litigation were 
members of a class of persons who were not 
given notice of their right to appeal the denial 
of their applications for benefits or were 
otherwise adversely affected by alleged 
inadequate procedures on FEMA's part in respect 
to the appeal process. 
As a result of a settlement of the Smith v 
FEMA suit, FEMA has agreed to provide three 
types of benefits: 
• It will make funding available for 
replacement of single-room occupancy or 
other equivalent low-income housing units 
which contain a private sleeping room in 
each unit (SROs) and shelter units which 
were rendered uninhabitable by the 
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earthquake, to the extent such funding is 
requested by local governments or owners or 
operators of private nonprofit facilities; 
• It will make funding available for 
reimbursement to local governments for 
special housing vouchers, to provide interim 
temporary housing for individuals who were 
denied temporary housing assistance benefits 
under the 30 day rule; and, 
• It will provide housing assistance benefits for 
individuals whose claims were initially 
denied under the "shared housing" rule. In 
addition, FEMA has agreed to give notice of 
appeal rights to individuals who did not 
receive such notice initially and to 
promulgate guidelines for appeals. 
The total maximum amount of monetary 
benefits authorized pursuant to the settlement 
agreement for replacement of housing is 
$23,040,000.22 The individual breakdown of 
allocations per county is: 
Count)! Total FEMA 75% Share 
S. Francisco $5,535,000 $4,151,250 
Santa Cruz 5,925,000 4,443,750 
Alameda 11,580,000 8,685,000 
Although this case resulted in a settlement 
which does not constitute binding, legal 
precedent, it does provide a litigation model for 
future earthquake-related suits challenging how 
FEMA may employ eligibility criteria in future 
seismic disasters. Given the high probability of a 
major earthquake occurring in an urbanized 
area of California within the next 30 years, the 
combination of yet another loss of a large 
number of low cost housing units and the 
limited fiscal resources to replace them may 
make Smith v. FEMA the prototype for further 
uu;o:.auvu to the federal government to 
22 FEMA is responsible for funding only 75% of 
county expenditures, the of 75% of 
$23,040,000, unless percentage is 
waived. 
address the issue of low cost housing in any 
recovery effort. 23 
Private-Sector Issues 
Private-sector litigation arising from the 
Lorna Prieta earthquake appears to be centered 
on traditional disputes between insurance 
companies and their policy holders, and 
personal injury/wrongful death issues. 
INSURANCE ISSUES 
Some 30 lawsuits were filed in Santa Cruz 
County in the aftermath of the Lorna Prieta 
earthquake, alleging that major underwriters did 
not give the victims all the help they were due, 
a charge that one major carrier denied, noting 
that of more than 27,000 claims totalling $120 
million, it had received only 28 complaints. It is 
also alleged that claims adjusters lacked 
experience or training, and that damage claims 
were improperly closed with no or insufficient 
payment to victims. 
A major source of compensation for those 
injured or killed in the Lorna Prieta earthquake 
was workers' compensation. The concept of 
workers' compensation is based on liability 
without fault, and although there are specific 
limitations upon workers' compensation 
23 A year and a half after the Lorna Prieta earthquake, 
many low income Bay Area residents are still living in 
homes with leaking roofs and unstable foundations. 
Many homes have serious structural damage caused by 
the earthquake that has still not been repaired. 
Concerned community groups and low income 
homeowners directly affectea by the unfair practices 
filed an administrative petition in June of 1991 
alleging that the agencies responsible for 
compensating homeowners for needed rel')airs, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and 
the Department of Social Services' Individual and 
Family Grant Program (IFGP), have denied low 
income homeowners their fair share of relief. 
Petitioners are demanding that an oversight 
committee review cases to identify those people who 
were not adequately compensated; that FEMA/IFGP 
make additional funds available to those people; and 
that policies be changed so that the victims of future 
disasters are not also subjected to reputedly 
discriminatory practices. Inasmuch as the petitioners' 
administrative remedies have not been exhausted as of 
this date, a suit has not been filed. 
56 
payments,24 "acts of God" are not among them. 
A more complex workers' compensation-related 
issue involves the Cypress structure and whether 
employees were commuting from their jobs. 
While courts have developed "the going-and-
coming rule" that excludes workers' 
compensation coverage of regular commuters, 
litigation may yet arise over whether there was a 
business purpose to some victims' trips. More 
research of this issue will be necessary, as will its 
relation to the Legislature's "no fault" claim 
procedures that were instituted to compensated 
victims of the Cypress Street viaduct and the 
Oakland-San Francisco Bay Bridge collapses. As 
of this date, the California Department of 
Insurance reports that 419 Lorna Prieta-related 
claims have resulted in payments of $2,496,000. 
The Lorna Prieta earthquake also brought to 
light another earthquake-related coverage 
problem. In an unpublished decision denying 
review of an appellate court decision, the 
California Supreme Court rejected a Mill Valley 
homeowner's claim that insurance should cover 
newly required "code upgrades:•25 Although 
this denial of review does not set a legal 
precedent, it nonetheless has the effect of 
requiring the purchase of specific riders because 
damage payments only cover "equivalent 
replacement," not restoration in-kind of code 
updates or restoration of the "historic fabric" of 
a building. 
SAN FRANCISCO'S "WAREHOUSE" SUIT 
The litigation arising from the five deaths 
caused by the alleged earthquake-related partial 
collapse of an unreinforced masonry building, 
known as the Warehouse, located at 175 
Bluxome Street in San Francisco, provides the 
definitive example of the private sector tort 
claims arising from the Lorna Prieta earthquake. 
The case against the partnership owning the 
Warehouse was premised upon three theories of 
liability, termed "causes of action": traditional 
24 See Section 3600 et seq. of the Labor Code. 
25 See McCorkle 11. Stale Farm Insurance, Aug. 15, 1990. 
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negligence resulting in wrongful death; strict 
liability; and, maintenance of a public nuisance. 
Although not a cause of action, punitive 
(exemplary) damages were requested by the 
plaintiffs. The basis for the requested imposition 
of punitive damages was an allegation that the 
owners knew that the building had partially 
collapsed previously due to inherent structural 
problems and that it would not survive a 
moderate earthquake. It was claimed that the 
owners were advised that the structural 
deficiencies created a risk that the building 
might partially or totally collapse at any time 
and would be subject to collapse during a 
moderate earthquake. These allegations were 
supported by copies of engineering reports 
prepared for the defendant partnership. Despite 
this alleged specific knowledge, it was claimed 
that the defendant partnership deliberately 
failed to take any actions to correct the claimed 
structural deficiencies or warn others of the 
allegedly dangerous and defective condition of 
the building. The plaintiffs contended that the 
foregoing alleged actions and omissions 
constituted a conscious disregard for the public 
safety amounting to reckless conduct resulting 
in the fatalities giving rise to the suit. 
Available court documents indicate that the 
defendant partnership's primary defense was 
apparently based upon a claim that the fatalities 
were the result of an "obvious act of God," and, 
further, that punitive damages are 
unconstitutional. 
Unfortunately, from the academic 
perspective of learning from earthquake 
litigation, this suit was settled by the parties, 
and the issues were not resolved at trial and 
scrutinized by an appellate court. Consequently, 
no definitive case law will result from this 
litigation. Hence, the "act of God" defense still 
may be legitimately plead. The legal 
applicability of strict liability and the 
imposition of punitive damage to those who 
maintain a building known to be unsafe in an 
earthquake also remain unresolved. 
Compounding this lack of resolution is the fact 
that the settlements in this case contained a 
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provision imposing secrecy about the case.26 
However, a recent announcement indicated that 
the owner will pay $4.9 million to the families 
of three of the five people crushed to death and 
to an injured worker. The settlements were 
disclosed after confidentiality agreements 
expired October 1. Lawyers for the victims said 
it was just one of the first of significant 
payments from the building owner on claims 
that injuries were caused by earthquake safety 
defects. 
It should also be noted that the U.S. Supreme 
Court has expressly rejected the argument that 
punitive damages are unconstitutional, and 
claims for punitive damages may still be 
legitimately pleaded in earthquake-related 
litigation. (See Browning-Ferris Ind. v. Kelco 
Disposal, Inc., (1989) 109 S.Ct. 2909). Hence the 
next damaging earthquake will probably see 
these issues revisited, and perhaps resolved. 
Conclusions 
The legal aftershocks from an earthquake will 
continue long after the seismic aftershocks. 
Already, however, one may distill the following 
conclusions from the discussion above. 
Damaging earthquakes strike California on a 
regular basis; earthquakes with a magnitude of 6 
or greater on the Richter scale have struck 102 
times in the 140 years since California became a 
state. Every populated urban area in California 
has been struck with damaging forces and will 
be again. Seismologists currently believe there is 
a 67 percent chance of a major earthquake 
striking the San Francisco Bay area, and a SO 
percent chance of a similar magnitude 
earthquake occurring in southern California 
within the next 30 years. This makes the 
occurrence of a great earthquake not a question 
of "if" but rather of "when." Advances in 
26 Senate Bill 711 (Lockyer), introduced on March 6, 
1991, would bar such secrecy in settlements by 
providing that, as a matter of public policy, in civil 
actions based on personal injury or wrongful death no 
confidentiality agreement, settlement agreement, 
stipulated agreement or protective order which bars 
public disclosure of such an agreement shall be valid. 
seismology and engineering allow governmental 
leaders and planners to recognize where quakes 
may occur, to anticipate approximately when 
they will occur, and to make reasonable 
estimates of their expected intensity. Also, the 
phenomena that cause ground failure are 
known as well as the types of structural design 
and construction that are prone to failure. Both 
the private-sector and the public-sector have 
been able to predict with reasonable certainty 
what the economic impact of a great quake will 
be for specific areas of the state. Inasmuch as 
California earthquakes are demonstrably 
foreseeable and far from being unexpected or 
extraordinary occurrences, neither an 
earthquake nor the damages occasioned by an 
earthquake may be termed "an act of God." 
Settlements of private-sector suits, negating 
trial and appellate court review, will leave many 
legal issues unresolved in the area of traditional 
tort liability, as will the "no fault" procedures 
implemented by Government Code Section 997 
with regard to the Cypress structure and Bay 
Bridge collapses. The lack of legal precedent will 
be further exacerbated unless the appellate 
courts are more willing to certify earthquake-
related cases for publication as reported cases, 
e.g., the St. George Hotel decision. 
One of the major lessons is that it is 
extremely difficult to make well-considered 
decisions on technical issues such as geologic 
safety in the emotionally charged atmosphere 
following a major disaster. While the normal 
development review process is focused on long 
term safety, the earthquake repair process is 
unavoidably focused on expedited recovery. 
jurisdictions wanting to address geologic safety 
following a major earthquake--beyond 
minimum seismic standards-can expect strong 
pressure to relax those standards and expedite 
recovery. The lawsuit27 against Santa Cruz 
County, and enforcement litigation, if any, 
relating to planning and the permit process, 
arising out of the Lorna Prieta earthquake 
should be closely monitored. Their outcome 
could seriously affect government's ability to 
27 Olson v. Messier, supra, note 12, and the unserved 
class action suit noted at page 14. 
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Introduction 
in its of the lessons of the 
Lorna Prieta earthquake, the Seismic 
Commission held eight in several 
most affected the While 
there was similarity in the 
striking impression is that the issues and 
experiences emphasized in some locales were 
quite different from those in others. Watson-
ville's Lorna Prieta earthquake was 
different from Oakland's. It is not 
that affect individual communities 
based on many social 
and economic factors. In an effort to 
these differences and the 
exJDerien.ces of the 
affected by the 
contracted with six 
own suggestions and recommendations for 
'-H'u'J"'-"' in policy and programs that would 
assist the state and other communities in future 
un"'"'"""· The six 
individual reports for inclusion here are: Los 
San Santa 
of Santa 
The Commission's overall direction was that 
the should consider four 
brief 
""w"''" an array of 
susuzesti<>ns for 
'"""'"'"'""'"'''nt in and programs dealing 
with the earthquake hazard. 
Synthesis of Community 
Recommendations 
In its recommendations based 
on the Lorna Prieta a~ .... ,.,,,,, 
the Commission 
affected communities. The suinzesti<ms 
ways to reduce the level of destruction in future 
to deal with immediate 
""'_, . .__public service demands, and to 
the effectiveness of programs 
recovery and reconstruction 
processes. This section '-v•uvuc.:. 
recommendations for 
the State of California. 
HAZARD MITIGATION 
The communities recommended that the 
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" 
seismic codes were enacted 
Identification of areas of 
<> Of~J.lLl'C~ 
risk areas 
the three communities whose 
homeowners sustained much of the to 
older single family homes the State to 
require appropriate retrofitting of such 
dwellings. The community in which mobile 
homes were most severely damaged 
recommended that the State 
mobile home bracing. These actions would not 
only reduce damage and repair costs, but would 
also reduce the for fires. When these 
single family homes and mobile homes shift 
during an earthquake, often sever 
gas lines, and gas leaks are sources of 
fires. 
IMMEDIATE AND SHORT-TERM 
RESPONSE NEEDS 
The State's immediate response to an 
"""' ... ''"'" should be The State 
demand for fire 
water 
for 
Several communities endorsed the 
Command and stated that the State 
should 
management. Not was it rPr\nrtPrl 
but also its use 
among local This in tum 
""~f"'"'''- '89 exercise made a very 
contribution to effective and 
after the 
mu·ct~·n that certain 
Management Operational Area organizational 
scheme. This often requires six levels of 
bureaucratic approval for cities' requests for 
resource authorization (obtaining mission 
numbers). It was further suggested that advance 
for routine requests be agreed to 
in the form of memorandums of understanding. 
Communities reported the ATC-20 damage 
assessment method and OES's volunteer 
inspector program to be very important and 
helpful. At the same time, improvements in the 
method and program were widely suggested. In 
several cases, the process became 
controversial and very difficult to manage. A 
is needed for accurate posting of 
and should be 
'"'''"~""'·J· The should be 
Local coordination between the business 
and after a disaster 
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for emergency response does not work in the 
longer term recovery period. 
COMMUNITY RECOVERY 
The communities were unanimous in calling 
for flexibility in implementing disaster 
assistance programs to facilitate coordination 
with local programs and staff and adaptation to 
local practical realities. The community reports 
had many examples of inappropriate or 
troublesome programmatic applications. Design 
and management of recovery programs should 
be as simple as possible. Current program 
administration is too complex. Administration 
is decentralized, diffuse and enormously 
encumbered with required paperwork and 
demands for documentation. In short, the 
disaster assistance application and review 
processes need a thorough overhauL 
Several communities called for revising State 
and federal assistance relating to temporary 
housing assistance (long-term shelter needs). 
The assistance guidelines have only limited 
applicability to the timely replacement of 
damaged buildings that house low-rent housing 
units. In a major urban earthquake, thousands 
of such units will be severely damaged and 
destroyed. In many cases, marketplace 
economics will not support replacement of this 
housing at all, let alone as low-rent units. 
Thus, thousands of tenants will be effectively 
and permanently displaced from housing, and 
there are currently no State or federal disaster 
assistance programs to deal with a housing 
problem of this nature or magnitude. One 
community suggested distribution of block-
grant money through local housing agencies as 
a partial solution to this problem. 
Confusion and associated time delays were 
widespread concerning local jurisdiction costs 
that FEMA would or would not reimburse. 
Several communities called for State/federal 
guidance on the types of costs that would be 
considered eligible for reimbursement. From 
observing this process in the Lorna Prieta 
earthquake, some jurisdictions concluded that 
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many State/federal Public Assistance Program 
decisions were unnecessarily arbitrary. Some 
also found the dollar amounts ultimately paid 
insufficient to cover legitimate costs. 
Although the premise of federal disaster 
assistance funding is replacement of damaged or 
destroyed facilities "in-kind," aid needs to be 
available for "reasonable betterment." It was 
suggested that some kind of loan program be 
established by the State and made available to 
local governments to pay for replacing such 
things as old and inadequate storm drain 
systems. Even though they may have been only 
partially damaged they cannot merely be 
patched up for future use in a downtown area 
being rebuilt. 
Some basic redevelopment legislation should 
be written and ready for adoption in an 
emergency, or else be adopted in a generic form 
and ready for quick modification to meet 
postearthquake needs. One city estimated that 
availability of such State legislation "on the 
shelf" would have helped avoid a lot of 
uncertainty and as much as six months delay in 
recovery financing. 
The State should require local jurisdictions to 
develop community recovery plans with at least 
as much emphasis as is currently placed on 
immediate emergency response. Recovery is 
much more complex than immediate response, 
and in most cases will result in more dramatic 
and longer-lasting implications. 
When damage is widespread, local 
jurisdictions, particularly smaller ones, lack 
capacity for unilateral response to the recovery 
needs of their communities. Local plans should 
be developed to include adopted postearthquake 
recovery policies certified by the State for the 
long-term community recovery. Such plans and 
policies should address at least the following 
topics: 
• Specific plans for providing consistency with 
State or federally mandated hazard 
mitigation plans 
• Standards for the repair of damaged 
buildings, including historical buildings 
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" Criteria for the demolition of severely 
damaged buildings, including historical 
buildings 
" Standards for acceptable alteration of 
discretionary land use approval processes 
" A State policy outlining and defining the 
range of local discretion expected to be 
exercised in recovery and reconstruction land 
use policy 
" Criteria for requiring stricter-than-normal 
standards in land use and construction, 
where justified by postearthquake data 
" Pre-earthquake review of financial 
regulations for local government budget and 
accounting procedures, to assure the 
expeditious conduct of local government 
business in response and recovery 
Finally, it was commonly observed that 
owners who had earthquake insurance were able 
to avoid many delays and other problems. This, 
in turn, reduced the recovery workload and level 
of monetary need from disaster assistance 
programs. Accordingly, several communities 
suggested that the State find ways to encourage 
owners to purchase earthquake insurance. 
The six sections that follow were written and 
made available by jurisdictions affected by the 
Lorna Prieta earthquake. While the material has 
been edited for language and style, the contents 
as submitted, expressing frustrations, along with 
suggestions and conclusions, remain intact. 
Town of Los Gatoszs 
The Town of Los Gatos is located in the 
foothills of the Santa Cruz Mountains and 
covers about 11 square miles, including hillsides 
as well as flatland areas. The as of 
january 1, was 28,197. The October 17, 
1989, the Lorna Prieta caused 
to the Town. The 
stock in Los Gatos is comprised of many pre-
1900 structures, in the downtown. 
residential structures were ,_.,.,u''l'.'-·~ 
because either did not have a <v<ul\.-""·'v' 
28 Submitted the Town of Los Gatos, 
of Planning. 
were not bolted to the foundation, or had a 
pony or wall failure. There are also a 
number of unreinforced masonry (URM) 
commercial buildings in the downtown area 
which sustained damage. 
One of the biggest causes of damage to 
residential properties was cripple wall failure, 
in the old Victorians. Some of these 
homes jumped off their foundations and 
dropped three to four feet when cripple walls 
collapsed. In Los Gatos, homes that were bolted 
but did not have adequate shear walls sustained 
more damage than homes that were not bolted 
at all. Then Governor Deukmejian vetoed a bill 
that would have required older residences to be 
bolted to their foundations and the installation 
of shear wall panels wherever necessary. The 
primary basis for this veto was a concern that 
the cost of mandatory retrofitting would pose a 
burden for especially fixed-income 
homeowners. The Town recommends that this 
issue be reconsidered. At the very least, 
residences should be required to have shear 
strength and the foundation bolted at the time 
of resale. 
BUILDING PERMIT PROCESS 
It is important for cities and counties to 
develop policies on procedures that will be used 
in an emergency before a natural disaster occurs. 
A clear vision of where the community wants to 
go and where it wants to be is essentiaL The 
Town had not done this prior to the earthquake, 
and had to scramble to prepare and adopt new 
policies following the earthquake. The Town 
Council held an emergency meeting on the 
Sunday after the earthquake to establish pvu~''-" 
for and restoration. A 
restoration program was established to handle 
various earthquake-related applications, such as 
u-.uHJu•"~v.'"'' reconstruction of structures, 
relocation of displaced and 
:>n>rwn.v:. l to use a motor home or 
trailer as housing. 
Fortunately the Town Council had a dear 
idea of what it wanted. The Council adopted 
64 
and 
unreinforced masonry structures. 
Ordinance 1801 for the demolition of 
demolished a POJttlo•n 
structure rather than 
Of the more than 800 structures, 
three commercial buildings were completely 
de:stn)V€:d as a result of earthquake damage. 
Twenty-five residential structures had been 
nnrr"TPri for COmplete demolition as Of January 
1, 1991. Two commercial and eleven residential 
buildings approved for demolition were 
considered to be historically significant. 
To assist property owners, the Town's 
Planning Department developed the following 
handouts: 
1. Guidelines for Repair and Reconstruction 
of Earthquake Damaged Buildings 
2. Application Procedures for the 
Demolition of Residential/Commercial 
Structures 
3. Administrative Procedure for Temporary 
Housing Due to the Earthquake 
4. Application form for the relocation of 
businesses displaced by the earthquake, or 
repair or reconstruction of a demolished 
structure (ERC approvals) 
A property owner has two options for 
reconstructing a building which was partially or 
completely demolished. The Town Council's 
Guidelines for Repair and Reconstruction of 
Earthquake Damaged Buildings specify that 
replacement structures are to be identical in size 
and use to the original structure, or in cases 
where remodeling was done, they may be 
rebuilt as they previously existed. Up to 100 
square feet of floor area may be added to 
residential buildings under the restoration 
process. If an applicant proposes to construct a 
replacement structure that is substantially 
different from the original, or to add more than 
100 square feet to a residence, the regular 
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historic or a 
"'"""'vu, any 
fees are 
assessed. The intent of the Council's was 
the Town back to what was before the 
The fee waiver and streamlined 
review were offered as incentives to nrr'"'"'"+-' 
owners to encourage what 
prior to the 
time and cost. 
The Town Building Department established a 
fairly complete list of properties 
shortly after the earthquake. On November 6, 
1990, a letter was sent to approximately 300 
property owners who had not applied for 
building permits advising them of filing 
deadlines to qualify for fee waivers. On 
November 16, 1990, a letter was sent to owners 
already having building permits advising them 
to get an addendum to their permit (or to 
obtain a new permit if any additional work was 
to be done above that for which the original 
permit was issued). Advertisements were also 
placed in local newspapers to alert property 
owners of filing deadlines. The Town 
encouraged property owners with questions or 
unusual circumstances to talk with staff 
regarding their specific situation. 
In spite of these efforts to notify property 
owners and encourage them to start the 
restoration process, there were, as of January 
1991, approximately 200 properties which were 
"yellow"- (limited entry) or "red"- (building 
unsafe) tagged that had not notified the Town 
of their intentions regarding repairs. 
BUREAUCRATIC DELAYS 
Although the restoration process has been 
very successful and many damaged buildings 
have been repaired or rebuilt, the Town is 
confronted with a number of problems. There 
are many property owners who have not yet 
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approached the Town for information or to 
submit an application for repair work. One 
reason for this is people have had a very hard 
time reacting and making decisions. Fifteen 
months after the earthquake, there are property 
owners who are still waiting for approval of 
loans, or for insurance settlements. Public sector 
funding for earthquake repairs has been almost 
nonexistent. Few owners have obtained Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Small 
Business Administration (SBA) or California 
Disaster Assistance Program (CALDAP) loans. So 
far, 25 CALDAP loans have been approved and 
funded by the state and two property owners 
have received Red Cross grants of $30,000. It has 
been very frustrating for both staff and property 
owners who cannot otherwise proceed with 
restoration projects. The question of whether 
earthquake insurance should be mandatory has 
been a major issue in Los Gatos. The owners 
who had earthquake insurance or were 
independently able to finance their projects are 
the ones who have been most successful in 
getting their businesses reopened, and/or 
getting damaged structures demolished, 
reconstructed or repaired. 
Another unforeseen problem is how to 
handle normal activities in addition to dealing 
with the emergency situation. Only a few days 
after the earthquake, contractors were in the 
Building Department requesting inspections and 
permits for ongoing projects, and residents were 
requesting approval of business licenses and 
home occupations from the Planning 
Department. People who are not personally 
affected by the crisis expect to receive the same 
service that they usually get. 
HISTORIC PRESERVATION VS. 
DEMOLITIONS 
nr<'""'rvatinn is an issue for 
like Los Gatos which have a 
historic 
Town and on individual nUHlPrtu 
demolish structures right away before they 
could even be properly inspected and evaluated. 
The only buildings which should be 
immediately demolished are those which 
present a public safety problem or are in danger 
of falling on neighboring structures. In most 
cases, severely damaged buildings were able to 
be shored up or fenced off to eliminate any 
hazard. The three commercial buildings which 
were demolished were taken down within thirty 
days of the earthquake because they were 
endangering adjacent properties. The bricks 
from these buildings were saved to be reused on 
the replacement structures. One of the three is 
presently being reconstructed and will be sliced 
the original brick for use as a veneer on the 
front elevation. It seems a disservice to have 
FEMA and other agencies push to have buildings 
torn down right away, as long as life and safety 
can be protected. 
DISCREPANCIES IN REPAIR ESTIMATES 
Another problem is getting the experts to 
agree on what should be done with a 
building. As an example, a historic 
commercial building in the downtown was 
significantly damaged. Known as the La Canada 
Building, it is a landmark located at the corner 
of North Santa Cruz Avenue and Main Street. 
The owners had six different engineers inspect 
the structure before they found one that could 
save the building at an economically feasible 
price. The original estimate for saving the 
building was $6 million. VSL Corporation was 
able to retrofit the building for seismic safety 
and at the same time preserve the historic value 
for about $1 million. Another positive result is 
the property owners will now be able to get 
insurance for the building (the structural 
engineer was able to demonstrate that the 
structure will be safe and will meet enough of 
the current building code to make it insurable). 
A second historic the Rankin Block, 
was to be demolished and rebuilt. Two 
different structural about 
costs of seismic retrofit and restoration 
versus demolition and reconstruction. The 
Town Council denied the demolition 
permit, relying on expert information from the 
State Office of Historic Preservation's structural 
engineer rather than expert information from 
the engineer hired by the applicant. It would be 
very helpful to get representatives from various 
fields to meet to discuss the issues involved in 
restoring historic buildings. Historians, 
architects, structural engineers, building 
inspectors, contractors, bankers, and insurance 
companies could each give their own 
perspective on historic preservation for the 
benefit of the other professionals. More 
importantly, the establishment of guidelines 
would be easier and they would be more 
effective. 
LOSSES AND COSTS 
The Town of Los Gatos has lost a significant 
amount of revenue due to businesses not 
reopening or relocating outside the Town, and 
waiving of building and planning fees. About 
$700,000 was lost in revenues in 1990, which 
was more than expected. Expenditures for the 
Town were also uncommonly high (about $1.4 
million). It is anticipated that for the fiscal year 
1991 additional expenditures will be $1.3 
million and loss revenues will be $560,000. 
City of Oakland29 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
Oakland, Office of 
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In addition to on response 
categcJric~s of mutual Oakland supports the 
concept of developing mutual aid 
ur.,,,m,Pnt<: with cities and counties in different 
areas of the state that are unlikely to be 
impacted by the same disaster. For example, the 
City of Oakland could develop a mutual aid 
agreement with the City of Long Beach. These 
cities are similar in population, demographics, 
and available resources. Under the agreements, 
the cities in the unaffected areas would assist 
their "sister cities" in the affected areas in the 
event of a disaster. 
While the Emergency Management 
Operational Area concept, which identifies 
counties as operational areas, is an appropriate 
management system for cities which are without 
full-time emergency services departments, it is 
not an effective or appropriate system for large 
cities (population over 300,000). In the case of 
Oakland, the City has a full-time Office of 
Emergency Services, and it is not practical to 
work through Alameda County Sheriff's 
Department (which employs two coordinators 
to manage the County's OES and coordinate 
response for 14 cities). It would be more 
appropriate for Oakland, perhaps in 
conjunction with Emeryville, Alameda, and 
""'·lu>IPv to be considered a separate operational 
area. 
The current developed by FEMA 
and State OES for the procurement of federal 
resources by a local jurisdiction are cumbersome 
and The current process is if the City 
needs a federal resource, it makes the 
the County. The County passes the 
to the State O.E.S. Regional Office. The 
"'"!'"-"'"" Office then forwards the to 
State OES in Sacramento, which 
the to FEMA "'"'""H-'H'H 
FEMA "~1,,~'""' 
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resource 
memorandums of un.derst:an,jintg 
between federal and state resources and 
un:sol<CtH)ns in which reside. These MOUs 
difficult it was to conduct rumor 
the non local media. There was little 
control of the network media the local 
local OES offices can establish better 
MASS CARE AND SHEL TEll 
schools as locations for emergency shelters. 
Local school districts would be better 
RECOVERY 
of the center was more 
effort should have made to address the 
""'V"I''H FEMA 
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KeJ;tlOJn<U Office reviewers. due to the 
limited FEMA staff, assigned to 
Oakland are often reassigned to other disasters. 
This causes delay and confusion while the 
assigned representatives become familiar with 
Oakland's applications and appeals, frequently 
requiring the entire process to begin again. 
While FEMA has standard labor rates for 
reimbursement, many of these rates are 
unrealistically low given the Bay Area's high 
cost of living. Although FEMA has recognized 
this in principle, inspectors often fail to apply 
this principle when preparing damage survey 
reports (DSRs) for the City. 
Improved coordination between FEMA and 
the State OES Disaster Assistance division and 
respective regulations would help to ease the 
recovery and reimbursement process. On 
occasion, FEMA will not recognize State 
requirements, such as those imposed by the 
State Historical Preservation Office (SHPO), 
which makes the evaluation of recovery projects 
especially difficult. 
PIUVATE ASSISTANCE 
Over fifty small businesses in the downtown 
area have remained closed since the 
Economic injury is estimated at over $20 
million, annually. Small Business 
Administration (SBA) loans could not 
adequately address the problems. In many cases 
the businesses have not been able to relocate 
and recover. These individuals need •nr•rr-''"n"' 
recovery "'"'i"t'.r"'" rather than one-time grants 
or loans. 
FEMA 
income shelters room occupancy 
a result of class action lawsuit filed 
Alameda 
all those The cost estimate to replace 
low-income housing lost in the earthquake is 
almost $27 million. Of the approximately 2,500 
Oakland residents made homeless as a result of 
the earthquake, 1,500 are still without 
permanent shelter. The stock of affordable 
housing has decreased significantly, while the 
number of shelter beds in Alameda County has 
increased by only 100. 
In addition, FEMA requires that the entire 
settlement amount be expended within one year 
of the settlement which is an unrealistically 
short period for developing an effective program 
and conducting the rehabilitation work. 
Amending the FEMA requirements for residents 
of low income housing, to include SROs will 
better facilitate the assistance to those 
individuals and avoid litigation. 
CALIFORNIA DISASTER ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM (CALDAP) 
While the CALDAP program provides 
financial assistance to repair or replace owner-
occupied housing, and to complete other 
necessary repairs to bring a home into 
compliance with local code requirements, the 
program was unable to assist commercial 
property owners with repairs. Commercial 
establishments in Oakland, many of which 
house room occupancy units for low-
income are !eft with no means to 
finance rehabilitation work. it has 
been difficult for the City to rebuild 
its low-income housing units, 95 percent of 
which were the earthquake. 
An amendment to or a revision of 
"-J<.•.uuuvu->, may need to be enacted in 
order for commercial 
HHA'-'>-U<>'C residential COmmercial nrrH"tPTtU 
in the program. 
rental owners have 
program, which 
assistance in a timely manner. Because the 
program requires evidence that borrowers have 
sought financing from other disaster assistance 
programs, such as FEMA, many have waited 
over a year for a response from CALDAP-R. 
It is recommended that the State review and 
revise the requirements for CALDAP-R to ensure 
that assistance can be provided in a timely 
manner. 
RECOVERY LEGISLATION 
1. 1/4 Cent Sales Tax for Earthquake Recovery 
(Assemblyman Rusty Areias). 
While this special legislation was successful 
in generating almost $800 million in revenue, 
this amount cannot adequately address the 
recovery needs of the affected area. Given the 
State budget deficit, and the mood of the 
California electorate, recommending a 
permanent sales tax increase for earthquake 
recovery, mitigation, and preparedness may not 
be appropriate at this time. However, the City of 
Oakland would advocate that a lesser fraction 
sales tax increase, perhaps 1/16 of a cent, be 
enacted at a later date. 
2. Economic Recovery Provision of the 1974 
Disaster Assistance Act (Public Law 930288, 
Title V) 
This legislation makes available, through the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, a maximum of 
$250 million to jurisdictions which experience 
negative long-term economic effects as a result 
of a disaster. Because the Economic Recovery 
Provision has never before been implemented, 
activating it has proven to be very difficult. 
FEMA attorneys originally contended that this 
legislation did not exist. San Francisco City 
Attorney's Office was successful in determining 
its existence. 
In August 1990, Mayor Art Agnos of San 
Francisco requested that former Governor 
George Deukmejian recommend the 
implementation of this 
former Governor did not "'~·vvuu 
both the State Office of .t.rrterj~ertcy ,.,,...,;,...ne 
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local jux:isdictions to provide documentation on 
the economic effects. In addition, cities and 
counties affected by the Lorna Prieta earthquake 
are meeting regularly to discuss, among other 
issues, the strategy for accessing this legislation. 
Local representatives have met with members of 
Congress to lobby for the implementation of 
this legislation. Oakland encourages the State to 
pressure the Federal government to implement 
this legislation. 
PREPAREDNESS 
Volunteers. The Lorna Prieta earthquake 
revealed that volunteers can be a very valuable 
resource. Citizens selflessly assisted with 
response and recovery efforts at the collapsed 
Cypress structure in Oakland, in San Francisco's 
Marina District, and in other affected areas. 
Because it is known that volunteers will respond 
to subsequent disasters, it is in the City's best 
interest to train these residents in disaster 
response to make them an even more valuable 
resource. 
To this end, Oakland has developed a three-
module training program, entitled CORE-
Citizens of Oakland Respond to Emergencies. 
Under this program, Oakland residents are 
trained in Individual and Family Survival 
(Module 1), Organizing Volunteer Response 
Teams (Module 2), and Advanced Citizen 
Response, Basic First Aid, Fire Suppression, and 
Light Search and Rescue (Module 3). 
Although the City of Oakland has dedicated 
the resources to support the program, and OES 
personnel have provided the training, the City 
requests that the State help to provide the 
funding to equip the volunteer groups with the 
necessary supplies for earthquake response. 
The State may consider following up on the 
Natural Disaster Volunteer Corps Program (AB 
which the State Office of 
for state 
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Services to 
program. 
regional 
and administer the 
the California 
provide adequate training to emergency services 
personnel. 
MITIGATION 
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. 
Within strict dollar limits, the Stafford Act 
provides that the federal government will fund 
50 percent of approved hazard mitigation 
projects for jurisdictions in disaster declared 
areas. Local government and other applicants 
are responsible for providing the SO percent 
match. The amount expected to be available 
under the Lorna Prieta earthquake for hazard 
mitigation grants is approximately $30 million. 
While this grant program provides some 
assistance in the area of hazard mitigation, it is 
far from adequate. 
Oakland recommends that the State develop 
its own Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. In 
addition to providing funding in the area of 
hazard mitigation, the State's program would 
focus on priorities identified by the State of 
California, many of which are ineligible under 
the federal program. 
of 
with other cities in 
numbers of URM 
County 
Francisco3o 
San 
Nine of the eleven deaths in San Francisco 
attributed to the Lorna Prieta earthquake 
resulted from partially collapsed or severely 
damaged buildings. Many of the injuries and 
economic impacts of the earthquake are also 
directly related to building damage and there 
are lasting social and economic effects. The loss 
of housing, particularly housing for those with 
low and moderate incomes, has exacerbated an 
existing shortage of residential units. The costs 
of repairing and rebuilding damaged private and 
public buildings, and improving both damaged 
and undamaged buildings so that they will 
survive future (and larger) earthquakes, is too 
large to be borne locally. 
The following discussion of San Francisco's 
experience since the Lorna Prieta earthquake is 
organized into the general types of activities 
undertaken by government as a result of this 
earthquake: Life Safety (fire suppression and 
search and rescue); Building Safety (immediate 
inspection and posting of structures); 
Information Management; Shelter and 
Temporary Housing; Recovery (the Individual 
Assistance Program and the Public Assistance 
Program); and Hazard Mitigation. It 
concentrates on the activities in which there is a 
substantial State, or shared local/State/federal 
30 Submitted by the City and County of San 
Francisco, Department of City Planning. 
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responsibility, and on those activities where 
experience uncovered shortfalls of resources, 
inadequate preparation, or lack of coordination. 
In each section a short discussion of the events 
following the Lorna Prieta earthquake and an 
identification of problems which occurred 
precedes the general recommendations for 
future State actions and policies. 
San Francisco's Lorna Prieta experience shows 
that the design and management of recovery 
programs should be as simple as possible. 
Problems arose when programs were complex 
and numerous, and when many different 
agencies and levels of government were 
involved. The needs of victims could be better 
and more efficiently served if programs could be 
administered closer to the local level and with 
considerable local involvement. 
The local involvement that San Francisco 
recommends should be part of a comprehensive 
preparedness and response program tailored to 
local needs. The National Earthquake Hazards 
Reduction Act includes "hazard identification, 
vulnerability assessments, preparedness and 
response planning, mitigation planning and 
public awareness/education" among the eligibie 
activities which it will fund (on a cost-sharing 
basis). Because the Act treats "local units of 
government and or substate areas that include a 
number of local government jurisdictions" as 
definitionally equivalent to State agencies, we 
believe that this program could directly fund 
these local efforts, in addition to its funding for 
State agencies. In order to avoid the problems of 
excessive and duplicative documentation 
requirements and interagency procedures, this 
funding should be provided as a "block grant." 
It should be conditioned on the operation of an 
effective and efficient overall 
preparedness program, rather than on the 
examination of each small piece of the program 
against very standards. 
This is not to say, however, that there should 
be less State involvement in and 
recovery disasters. The State of ,._,a.!wuH 
should, in co<)P~!raltlOl 
design programs and which could be 
lmpl~!m,emtea on the local level and train local 
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staff. For example, OES is better prepared than 
most localities to design a model citizen 
volunteer training program, which could be 
used by cities and counties. 
Part of the State-level program should be the 
development of standards to be met by local 
agencies participating in disaster recovery, in 
order to assure that localities are well prepared 
to carry out the responsibilities that we have 
advocated they be given. These could include 
standards for and oversight of local 
preparedness plans and organizations, 
mitigation programs, and postdisaster 
administrative structures. 
Finally, many State programs were instituted 
in response to the Lorna Prieta earthquake, and 
are being funded by the temporary sales tax 
increase. The State, as well as local governments, 
should have legislation in place, including 
programs and revenue sources, which could 
automatically take effect or easily be enacted in 
response to an emergency. For example, after a 
declared emergency when damage estimates 
exceed some predetermined level (perhaps $500 
million) a temporary sales tax increase could 
occur automatically. 
LIFE SAFETY 
Immediately following the Lorna Prieta 
earthquake, emergency response was 
by municipal response organizations, and 
primarily by the San Francisco Fire Department. 
The Fire Department responded to 34 fires 
between 5:04 p.m. on October 17 through 
midnight on October 19. All resulted or 
indirectly from the The Fire 
with the help of citizen "nlnr1tPPr~ 
.:u;~"~~cu in search and rescue efforts where 
had The Fire 
response to fires and collapsed ~~"~""'"J 
""'-'"'"'U.L.:. to standard 
and processes, 
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as well as within FEMA's Hazard Mitigation 
Grant Program administered by OES. 
Fire Department staff also identified some 
areas in which state or regionwide planning and 
coordination could improve response. Fire, 
Police, and Emergency Medical Services staff are 
well trained to carry out their emergency 
functions. However, in a major disaster a much 
larger pool of people trained in fire suppression, 
first aid, simple search and rescue, and building 
safety than is currently available will be needed. 
It should include both nonemergency city staff 
and citizen volunteers, and be able to work 
under firefighters' direction or independently. 
Many neighborhood groups have expressed 
interest in being trained in emergency response. 
The Fire Department has begun a training 
program which involves fifteen hours of 
training. The department trained 24 citizen 
volunteers in its first year. Clearly, larger scale 
effort is needed, but is currently beyond 
available local resources. 
The State is currently developing a program 
to assist local governments develop civilian 
volunteer training. The as part of its 
responsibility for education and information 
should the 
establishment of local citizen volunteer 
programs. This could include funding local 
training programs, providing manuals and 
teaching materials to local agencies, training the 
local trainers, providing equipment to citizen 
volunteers, perhaps including a training session 
for citizen volunteers by the California 
Specialized Training Institute. 
In some cases, essential City staff, including 
emergency responders, were unable to travel 
into the City immediately after the earthquake. 
Had the Golden Gate Bridge been out of service, 
this would have been a much more severe 
problem. The State should facilitate an 
intraregional system, including local 
governments and public and private 
transportation providers, to immediately 
transport essential personnel to and from 
predetermined points after a major disaster. 
BUILDING SAFETY 
The Bureau of Building Inspection (BBI) was 
responsible for the categorization of damaged 
buildings, and for immediate decisions about 
the safety of damaged buildings. BBI, with the 
help of volunteer inspectors, used the Applied 
Technology Council's ATC-20 system to classify 
buildings as "red" (unsafe), "yellow" (limited 
entry), and "green" (no restriction on use or 
occupancy). Over 18,000 inspections were 
performed after the earthquake. 
As of a month after the earthquake, 234 
buildings had been red tagged. Fifty-five of these 
buildings had already been removed from this 
category by being demolished, secured, repaired, 
or reinspected and recategorized. 
By August 1990, ten months after the 
369 buildings had been red-tagged, 
and seven remained in that category. Fifty-one 
buildings which had been identified by the 
Bureau of Building Inspection (BBI) as unsafe 
had been demolished. Thirty-five of the fifty-
one demolished red-tagged buildings were 
residential buildings, containing a total of 512 
units. 
buildings are currently 
'-'""'l'.'Ju<c'-u as "secured" (this term is not part of 
the ATC-20 system). Secured buildings are 
unoccupiable. Of these 78 buildings, 51 contain 
residential units, with a total of 591 units. Thus, 
over 1,100 residential units have been removed 
from use by demolition or securing. 
Approximately 1650 buildings, including 
about 730 residential buildings, were yellow-
tagged after the earthquake (this includes about 
90 buildings which had been red-tagged and 
reclassified to yellow, and are among the 369 
buildings discussed above). Very few of these 
buildings have been demolished. (fo put these 
figures in context, there are about 120,000 
buildings in San Francisco. About 1.6o/o of the 
total building stock was at some point yellow-
tagged or red-tagged.) 
Many other buildings sustained nonstructural 
damage such as cracked plaster and broken 
glass, and were not classified red or yellow. The 
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residential units lost or unavailable for extended 
had housed low and moderate income 
including several 
hotels. Because of the 
of low-cost 
in a long-term social impact, and was one of the 
of the on San 
Francisco. 
BBI identified several deficiencies in the ATC-
20 system and developed some new categories 
in addition to the red, yellow and green 
categories set out by ATC-20. These observed 
problems should be given the highest of 
consideration in OES's current evaluation of the 
program. San Francisco's BBI developed a new 
category, "Secured," that is used for 
buildings which do not create a hazard to 
adjoining structures or to any street or public 
way, but which are unsafe for occupancy or use. 
A building classified "Secured" is tagged neither 
red nor yellow. Examples of secured buildings 
are those where work under a 
has been to shore up, 
demolish or otherwise secure the 
when it's source of 
of a sequence of detailed 1m;pect1ons, 
with buildings moving 
exclusive of red to to green. 
The State OES assisted San Francisco 
volunteer inspectors from outside of 
While the volunteers themselves were 
enough necessary coordination for their 
food, In future disasters 
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INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
officials were confronted with enormous 
demands for information from the the 
estimates of and 
displaced people were needed for response and 
recovery efforts. The City had little data 
capability. 
The State of California should address this 
problem by 
develop standard 
having available standby 
prc>gram.mt~o to handle disaster data, and 
training local agencies in ror,,-,.rhn 
before a disaster. 
SHELTER AND TEMPORARY HOUSING 
ASSISTANCE 
resources, some who lived in 
occupancy and some with ~~''JUUF. 
substance abuse or mental health un_;v,,_u 
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to 
uuu"•uJ<. program, 
would have better been able to meet the needs 
for whom the 
grim situation. 
The temporary assistance program is 
intended to provide "suitable" 
housing until suitable housing is 
available. Because the determinations of what 
constituted "suitable" who was 
entitled to assistance, and how the 
program should be administered were made 
persons limited of 
the San Francisco 
Francisco resident 
how to handle many persons that were 
displaced the were made. FEMA 
established a $950 rental allowance for 
all households, regardless of size or of of 
housing needed. Larger families found it 
impossible to find in San 
Francisco at this rent. Federal ... .,.,,,,.,,~J 
unwilling to maintain any 
programs. For to 
fund furniture costs, even when it 
resulted in a cost of less than $950 for a 
""'~''-'"'""~ household. 
.. ~~J'"" assistance program 
consisted of subsidies to be used in 
rental market. In a 
need in urban 
areas, and this service in local 
assistance programs. An ad hoc referral 
the and the Red Cross 
program would include local ~o·vernn1ertt 
"l'-'ClH~!c:>, and and 
providers. 
The federal legislation and regulations 
the housing assistance 
program specifically authorize states, and 
through the states, local jurisdictions, to take 
over substantial administrative responsibilities. 
(44 CFR 206.101(s)). A state requesting such 
authority "must have an approved plan prior to 
the incident [and] must comply with FEMA 
program regulations and " It also 
nrt>VH1P"' for funds for technical assistance to 
states to make this The State should 
pursue this avenue. Local 
could much more implement 
programs because their staffs 
with local conditions 
tmm{~Ql;nery available. 
RECOVERY 
Small Business Administration (SBA), the 
of and others. The 
administration of some of these programs, 
the and disbursement 
prcx:e,dm:es, is by those federal 
Other federal programs are 
State programs are 
rather than uu''H"-a 
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considerable expense. 
""'nl•""''"" and officials became 
were 
who were unaware of or frustrated 
This involvement was made the 
more difficult because San Francisco had had no 
experience or preparation in dealing with 
federal disaster response. When the 
of this task became dear, the City hired one full-
experienced federal recovery to 
train and coordinate other staff who were 
to be involved in federal and State programs. 
About twenty City staff people devoted full time 
to these programs for about nine months. The 
Public Assistance Program reimbursements for 
these administrative costs did not cover the 
City's expenses. 
City and County agencies, if adequately 
prepared, would have been better able to 
administer recovery programs and respond to 
local recovery needs. They have knowledge of 
and interest in local conditions and local 
culture, and motivation to achieve recovery. 
Because they are familiar with the area, and are 
on hand during and immediately after a 
disaster, they will likely have a better 
understanding of evolving disaster conditions. 
Active local involvement could have avoided 
some duplication of effort between those 
administering different programs. As an 
example of this kind of duplication, federal 
employees administering the SBA loan program 
had to inspect buildings to confirm that they 
had been damaged or destroyed. That 
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HH.UU.'O an 
effective administrative structure which 
the for sp<::cnK pv'"'~"~""''~" 
and response 
described in the first section of this 
INDIVIDUAL AND FAMILY GRANT 
PROGRAM 
Prr.rrr:>Yn is intended to nr.'"H11ir1P 
the 
""'o'''""'""'-' grants and loans to renters, 
homeowners and businesses whose homes, 
buildings or personal property were lost or 
damaged. At least six different programs, with 
different points of contact, were operating in 
San Francisco after the Lorna Prieta earthquake. 
The time involved for individuals applying 
for individual assistance was sometimes 
excessive because of the large number of 
different agencies and regulations involved and 
their general lack of flexibility. For example, 
because of confusion about the scope of the 
authority and responsibility between OES, 
FEMA, HUD and the Department of 
Transportation, it took nine months to 
determine whether expenditures to repair a 
possible landslide affecting private homes, 
public land and streets were eligible for 
reimbursement, and by what agency. This delay 
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resulted in substantial hardship and costs to 
u:~tu<:ul"• and to the federal government which 
was funding temporary housing for these 
displaced residents. They are still displaced at 
the time of this writing-a year and a half after 
the earthquake. 
Even in simpler situations, the time of 
victims and of those administering the programs 
was often wasted by lack of coordination 
between state and federal agencies. For 
the California Natural Disaster Assistance 
Program (CALDAP) was available only to those 
who had been denied federal aid. Even if it was 
dear that federal assistance would not be 
available, victims were required to go through 
the application process in order to be formally 
denied, a process which in some cases took up 
to six months, and which discouraged 
applicants. Separate damage inspections were 
required by the state program. Because these 
inspectors were more familiar with local code 
requirements and labor and material costs, this 
additional inspection often resulted in 
damage assessments, and strengthened some 
applicants' cases. But these additional 
inspections could only occur months after the 
federal inspections. Delegation of the initial 
inspection responsibility to localities would 
have saved time and money, for both the 
and for earthquake victims. If the 
was approved after local 
release of funds the State 
Controller could add two months to the process. 
Although local screening of possible 
applicants that about 500 were 
potentially only 182 actually applied for 
the CALDAP program, suggesting a high 
of among victims. The total 
value of these loan was about $23.9 
million. no state loans had been 
funded under this program, 
pr<Xt~ssing and recommendations for 
of a number of "'"''"'H''-'"'v' 
1, 1991 
14 
The federal lack of familiarity with local 
conditions was reflected in a lack of recognition 
of the high cost of building in San Francisco by 
SBA inspectors, and of necessary related costs, 
such as required code work. Consequently, 
many of the approved loan applications were 
approved at dollar values well below the 
amounts applied for, based on unreasonably low 
federal cost estimates. The process for 
these determinations was lengthy. This forced 
applicants to apply to the CALDAP program as 
which had more realistic cost estimates, as 
a de facto "appeals process." 
The Mayor's Office of Housing conducted a 
survey of thirty owners of "red-tagged" 
multifamily properties in the Marina. Only one 
of these owners felt satisfied with the amount, 
terms, and timeliness of their approved loan. 
The remainder had often strong negative 
comments regarding the frustrations and 
of the experience. Several had been forced to sell 
property at a loss due to lenders' or investors' 
pressures, only to find out weeks later they had 
been given SBA approval. Frustration with the 
federal programs was so high that the U.S. 
Representative for the district had to assist over 
200 constituents through the process. The terms 
and bureaucratic approval process were 
sufficiently discouraging that several persons 
contacted said their decision not to apply for 
the state loan (which might have been more 
beneficial) was based on "disbelief that 
could ever expect any genuine help from any 
government entity." 
Many of the multifamily rental properties in 
San Francisco had a higher value 
than the maximum federal loan amount of 
$500,000. The average multifamily that 
""''"r,plv damaged in the Marina contained 
with a 
maximum 
'-H'"''vn. amounts, had to apply to and 
SBA in order to to the 
CALDAP program. 
While the State program included 
such as interest and 
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lost low-income the federal 
programs did not. Of the over 350 units in the 
survey in the 10 percent had, 
to the been rented at very-low-
income levels. Many owners expressed 
a concern that they could notre-rent units at 
those rates, the terms of the federal loan 
program, but would have been willing to if there 
had been sufficient incentives. Most of the units 
lost in the Marina District were rental and 
all the replacement units will be condominiums 
in order to repay conventional or SBA loans. 
Theretore, federal recovery policy has 
led to the de facto conversion of hundreds of 
rental units, many of which rented at low- and 
moderate-income to 
condominiums. This result is to the 
of the of Housing and Urban 
under nonemergency 
the '-''-Hl~,rc,~" 
intended those disaster to receive 
housing until suitable 
and it intended that 
u~~J•u,_be 
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determine whether those in need of assistance 
actually received the assistance they needed. A 
locally run program to match victims with 
resources, using a caseworkers 
"'>'lf''V'"'-'"' in which each disaster victim needs 
to deal with one government contact rather 
than could be more effective and 
efficient than the current and distant 
PUBUC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
Public facilities in San Francisco were also 
the earthquake. The City estimates 
facilities at 
''-""'"''"~ about $60 million 
buildings, $19 million u•aaa~;'­
$15 million ~"'H"t>~ 
'""'""'""' and $21 million .... "'"'~"' 
School District facilities. About $14 million will 
facilities of .. ~ .. ,."~u 
for the Public Assistance 
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the Public Assistance p,.,-,ar,,m 
Administration of the federal Public 
Assistance Program could be considerably 
simplified by changing the character of the 
program from one of reimbursement for 
exhaustively detailed expenses, to one that 
distributes "block grants" to local agencies. State 
and federal agencies could establish granting 
criteria which measure the magnitude of a 
disaster (which affects the ability of an area to 
recover) and the estimated damage. Assistance 
could occur quickly and without a detailed 
application process. Local governments could 
establish their own priorities for short-term and 
long-term recovery assistance and then make a 
full accounting of expenditures. 
HAZARD MITIGATION 
The State of California could promote seismic 
safety in housing in several ways. Existing state 
and federal programs to assist owners of low-
income or multifamily buildings undertaking 
building code-required repairs such as the 
federal Rental Rehabilitation Program, the 
California Housing Rehabilitation Program and 
the California Rental Rehabilitation Program 
should be expanded to include voluntary 
seismic upgrading. These programs generally 
contain per-unit spending caps and restrict 
spending to code-required improvements. 
Publicly subsidized housing rehabilitation 
projects should, as a matter of policy, encourage 
or even require funding for seismic work, 
rather than discouraging it. The recent voter-
approved statewide bond issue for seismic 
rehabilitation work is an example of a 
policy toward mitigation. it will not 
be sufficient to meet the needs for seismic 
'"''v'""'"'·"· Once this bond is 
be a disincentive for the 
residential 
San Francisco have not been or 
""''u'"'li"uc•u, and the evidence is that the costs 
that the owners may 
Recent to state 
law make it easier for the to institute 
receivership of damaged abandoned buildings, 
but such laws do not provide for the necessary 
construction or take-out financing. Current state 
law which authorizes court receivership for 
unreinforced masonry buildings which are not 
brought up to requirements should be expanded 
to cover postdisaster abandoned buildings. 
An earthquake presents an opportunity for 
research which could inform future mitigation 
efforts statewide. San Francisco took advantage 
of this. For example, the damage and damage 
patterns of all of the City's unreinforced 
masonry buildings was investigated after the 
earthquake. Although it may not have been 
explicitly intended, OES made this possible by 
supplying volunteer engineers and inspectors. In 
future disasters, the state should recognize this 
opportunity and encourage and publicize such 
efforts. Rebuilding also presents an important 
research opportunity. Repaired buildings should 
be monitored and have instruments installed to 
measure their response to future earthquakes. 
Particularly since some rebuilt and repaired 
buildings use new engineering techniques, 
important information could be derived from a 
systematic research effort. This could best be 
coordinated at the State level as part of the 
Seismic Motion Instrumentation Program. As 
part of this effort, the State should conduct 
detailed debriefings to collect information about 
how local agencies handled the problems they 
encountered. This information should then be 
passed on to others. 
SUMMARY 
To summarize the issues explored above, we 
believe that the State should encourage a 
"'"'"'"'u"''" and response 
program tailored to local needs. It should 
include hazard vulnerability 
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programs and which could be 
on the local level. The State 
program should include and 
standards in order to assure that localities are 
well prepared to carry out their 
Life Safety. The State is currently 
developing a program to assist local 
governments develop civilian volunteer 
training. The State should promote the 
establishment of local citizen volunteer training 
programs. This could include funding local 
programs, providing materials, training the local 
trainers, providing equipment to volunteers, 
perhaps including a in-situ training session for 
citizen volunteers by the California Specialized 
Training Institute. Topics could include fire 
suppression, first aid, search and rescue, 
building safety. 
The State should facilitate an intraregional 
system, including local governments and public 
and private transportation providers, to 
immediately transport essential personnel to 
and from predetermined points after a major 
disaster. 
Building Safety. The deficiencies in the 
ATC-20 system observed in San Francisco should 
be considered in OES's current evaluation of the 
ATC-20 program. For example the current 
procedures lack a category for buildings which 
do not create a hazard to adjoining structures or 
to any street or public way, but which are unsafe 
for occupancy or use, or for buildings which do 
not present an immediate hazard and can be 
occupied, but which require repairs. 
When outside volunteers are used, each 
group of volunteers organized by OES should 
have a "group leader" to provide and 
organizational support. 
Information Management. The State 
should work with local agencies to ,;,,.,,'"" 
standard reporting systems, perhaps including 
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uv~J,,ur. referral for 
should be established. It should be ,...,.,,.,.,.~,r~ 
with the 
groups. 
The State should develop a temporary 
housing plan and encourage local 
administration of the Temporary Housing 
Assistance Program as provided by federal 
regulations. 
Recovery. A program to prepare for local 
involvement in the postdisaster administration 
of both the Individual and Family Grant 
Program and the Public Assistance Program, as 
well as other recovery activities needs to be 
established. The State should assist local 
agencies in determining an effective postdisaster 
administrative structure. The State should 
provide an ongoing program of training in the 
requirements of state and federal programs. 
Local administration of this program should be 
part of a comprehensive preparedness and 
response program tailored to local needs. Part of 
the State-level program could be the 
development of standards to be met by local 
agencies, perhaps including standards for and 
oversight of local preparedness plans, mitigation 
programs, and postdisaster administrative 
structures. Postdisaster funding should be 
provided as a "block grant" conditioned only on 
the operation of an effective and efficient 
overall earthquake preparedness and recovery 
program. 
The State should enact a temporary sales tax 
increase which could automatically take effect 
when damage estimates exceed some 
predetermined level during a declared 
emergency. 
The State should better coordinate the 
California Natural Disaster Assistance vrr•ur:nn 
and federal assistance. Duplicate damage 
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Information about local such as 
code and building costs, should be 
into recovery programs. 
The State should nrr>Vi(1P 
to match victims with resources, 
caseworker in which each disaster 
victim needs deal with one 
contact. 
uvu:>1ux rehabilitation programs to assist owners 
of low-income or 
seismic up,!>""-"'''5· 
Current state law 
the Lorna Prieta 
1990. 
of 
1990. 
v<tH(!;[l(>Jcl, San Francisco 
1990. 
Tom Office of 
interview, November 1990. 
Laurence Chief 
interview, November 1990. 
and 
this 
t'\P1'<!rl'nr1PI had been roles in 
minutes after the 
1989, less than 30 
n.,,,,,,.,, . ., the EOC was in 
full operation at Fire Station #2 on the east side 
of the 
One reason for this response was 
Three years Santa Cruz had 
been threatened a flood on the San Lorenzo 
the EOC was activated. 
Critical on the orange 
vests which denote their roles: "Incident 
" "Public Information etc. 
the river did not but staff 
"v'""'''"r'roon a drill that was colored 
of a real emergency. 
retro:;pect, it is very clear that 
the Incident Command System, 
'"'"'xuu'~ responsibility, physically 
familiar with the and the roles 
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imm{~di:ately '""''"""'''i' to the devastated area; 
this would be the administrative center of 
recovery activities for the next eight weeks. 
As a result of this experience, the City of 
Santa Cruz has made planning for several 
of recovery part of its emergency response 
program. The specific profile of calamitous 
flood, never be 
But Lorna Prieta demonstrated that 
in many disasters, the recovery may 
extend for weeks, months, or even years. 
nu~u'"'"';.;.u most California cities and counties 
have emergency response programs, few have 
ucvc•cvu•cu plans for managing recovery. Setting 
up both general guidelines and some form of 
administrative structure for this activity can 
smooth the transition from the emergency 
response to the initial recovery phase. 
would were aU 
in the City's effective 
emergency response to the Lorna Prieta 
We believe that such drills are a 
success and they should be scheduled on a 
basis. 
THE BEGINNING OF TRANSITION 
were directed from the EOC at Fire Station #2. 
this time, aftershocks had the 
threat to life was no and the 
of the area had been 
secured by a chain-link fence. It became dear 
a new center should be 
established at the site of the 
from the emergency response 
of HH<U~',I',H 
The 
office trailers were 
PAC-OPS AND BEYOND 
The Pacific Garden Mall was-and is--the 
commercial heart of Santa Cruz. Before the 
600 businesses in the 
downtown area. After 34 commercial u-.uuu<<S" 
were demolished and an additional 375,000 
square feet of commercial space was damaged, 
206 businesses had been destroyed or dislocated. 
In the second week after the earthquake, 
and unexpected demands emerged. 
Business needed to access to cash 
rPon~t.Pn: and vaults. Lawyers and other 
IJllJl<=:>:uvua'" needed to retrieve files and other 
documents. Businesses needed to remove 
undamaged Residents needed to 
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access to 
hundreds of decisions 
The many 
of 
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control for 
RISING UKE THE PHOENIX 
before 
R"'""''""''"'' for them was contingent on 
undamaged inventory and then ""''-'L"J; 
temporary location in which to Getting 
the businesses in and out of the devastated area 
was a logistical challenge. Working with the 
Chamber of Commerce and the Downtown 
Association, Pac-Ops orchestrated a safe, orderly 
and effective inventory retrieval program. The 
participation of these groups was absolutely 
necessary to carry out this phase of the recovery 
effort. The Chamber of Commerce and the 
Downtown Association had the home phone 
numbers of business owners and managers. 
They had the people and the know-how to 
reach business owners to schedule inventory 
retrieval and other legitimate trips into the 
damaged area. They also had the trust of their 
fellow business people and often knew them 
personally. 
Carrying out this program wasn't easy. 
Communication was essential. Business people 
were willing to wait their turn to have access to 
monitors and o"'''"''" 
destruction was concentrated in the downtown 
commercial area of Santa 
numbers of residential units also suffered 
"'"'''-'·"staffed an outreach 
program to inform these owners that federal 
disaster aid was available to them. All of these 
functions were needed various stages of 
recovery. should be included in emergency 
response 
Within three weeks of the earthquake, 
tPrnnnr;•rv tent structures--the Phoenix 
v u.<u''"-~""''"' been erected downtown. These 
'"u'v"'"'""' businesses could use 
season. City 
""''""nnn,<>l worked with the business community 
this enormous task. Staffing for 
this activity was critical to the recovery process; 
such needs should be anticipated in emergency 
planning. 
Based on this experience, it's important to 
adjust personnel to the tasks that must be 
accomplished during this phase of recovery. It is 
critical that the local government understand 
the point of view of businesses which have been 
disrupted by a disaster. Operations cannot be 
carried out in a bureaucratic, "business as usual" 
fashion; risks must be taken. A flexible system is 
required that involves the stakeholders in a real 
way and public/private cooperation is absolutely 
essential. 
84 
LONG-RANGE RECOVERY 
Ap>pn:>Xim<tte.!y two months after the 
earthquake, Pac-Ops was reduced in size and 
moved. By this time, the Mall area was 
subdivided into those streets and buildings that 
were open, and those which were secured by 
fences, pending financial/planning decisions 
and/or rebuilding. A skeleton crew in one trailer 
would continue to provide controlled access and 
supervision of the area for another eight 
months. 
The City Council appointed a 36-member 
citizen group-Vision Santa Cruz-to develop an 
overall concept for rebuilding the downtown 
about two months after the earthquake. This 
process is still continuing. Consultants have 
been hired to create a downtown/streetscape 
plan based upon the general principles 
developed by Vision Santa Cruz. The City 
Council will adopt a version of this plan and 
rebuilding of the downtown will enter its final 
phase. 
Since the earthquake, however, the City has 
approved several projects during the interim 
recovery period. It was clear that overall 
planning would take a year or better, and if 
property owners wanted to begin sooner, they 
should be encouraged. Thus the City Council 
adopted an interim policy which allowed 
owners to rebuild if they submitted projects that 
were essentially the same size and use as their 
prequake structures. If they wanted to build 
something significantly larger or different, 
would need to wait for development of the 
downtown plan. 
This approach provided a reasonable amount 
of flexibility. Ten have been 
under these emergency At "·-~-... , 
one has been constructed. This illustrates 
of 
have remained in limbo 
over a year. Because of cost and'-",""'~'-"'''~'> 
some owners wanted to demolish these 
structures and rebuild. Historic or~:sel:vanomsts 
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wanted to save them. In one case, the issue went 
to court. These were threats to public 
thus they were surrounded by chain-link 
fencing. Structures adjacent to them--or within 
a safety area that was defined if they should 
fall-were also left in limbo. Basically, several 
blocks in the downtown remained paralyzed 
because of the unresolved issues these buildings 
presented. 
This was especially trying for the owners and 
employees of adjacent structures which could 
have been repaired were it not for the delay in 
resolving the status of the historic buildings. 
This in turn affected the willingness of financial 
institutions to lend money. Other owners in the 
downtown were reluctant to blaze the trail and 
rebuild before all the fences had been removed 
from the area and fult traffic flow was restored 
to Pacific Avenue. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based upon these experiences--particularly in 
the postemergency phases of recovery-the City 
of Santa Cruz has some recommendations 
concerning both regulations and delivery of 
state aid to communities which have suffered 
major disasters. 
The Mayor and City Manager of Santa Cruz, 
the Redevelopment and the Executive 
Director of the Chamber of Commerce all 
testified at a meeting of the Seismic Safety 
Commission on October 11, 1990. Their 
highlighted three areas in which 
and aid could be imnr'"'~·rl 
caused debate 
over historic buildings on Pacific 
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Avenue. The intent of SB 3X is 
unclear. The City of Santa Cruz recommends 
that the legislation be amended to define a 
specific process local jurisdictions must follow 
before historic buildings may be demolished 
after a disaster. When such structures present a 
threat to life and/or a threat to adjacent 
property, decisions concerning their disposition 
must be left to local government. The process 
allowing this action must be made very clear so 
that there is no ambiguity nor cause for legal 
challenges. The existing path-which the city 
suffered through under current SB 3X-would 
cause difficulties to potentially every other city 
in the state in the event of another major 
earthquake. 
A second area for improvement is 
redevelopment legislation. The City of Santa 
Cruz was well served by passage of SB 39X. This 
bill enabled the City to reconstitute its 
redevelopment area to develop tax increments 
after assessed valuations had been reduced 
drastically because of earthquake damage. 
Although this legislation allows the City to 
recapture tax increment revenues to pay for 
recovery projects, it took eight months for the 
bill to be processed and signed by the Governor. 
The City of Santa Cruz recommends that some 
basic boilerplate redevelopment legislation 
either be written and ready for adoption in an 
emergency, or be adopted in a generic sense and 
ready for modification. Thus other communities 
facing the same kinds of fiscal recovery for 
redevelopment projects would be saved 
approximately six months delay because 
enabling legislation would already be in 
The third area for improvement is the 
concept of emergency relief funding-
particularly for earthquake relief. The federal 
government operates this program through 
FEMA. The premise of emergency aid is to 
"replace in kind" what was lost. From an 
accounting point of view, it is to replace the 
value of what was lost. In a case such as Santa 
Cruz, where an earthquake wipes out an entire 
commercial center (including underground 
facilities damage), additional aid for reasonable 
"betterment" needs to be available. This may be 
a initiative that California could 
undertake to fill this gap. 
For example, the City of Santa Cruz didn't 
have a legitimate storm drain system 
downtown-many patchwork systems had been 
put together over a period of a hundred years. 
The City can't rebuild the downtown without 
installing a new storm drain system all at once. 
The current emergency funding system will not 
pick up these betterment costs. The City 
suggests that some kind of loan program be 
established by the State and made available to 
local governments to pay for these kinds of 
recovery costs. These loans would be repaid to 
the State, but they would relieve the cash flow 
difficulties which devastated communities 
experience in the first months and years after a 
major earthquake. 
SUMMARY 
The Incident Command System worked 
extremely well for the City of Santa Cruz in 
responding to the Lorna Prieta earthquake. 
Having roles clearly defined, and practicing with 
the system, helped the City react effectively 
during the emergency phase of the disaster. 
However, Lorna Prieta demonstrated that 
planning for subsequent phases of recovery 
should be part of each local government's 
emergency response program. 
Since no plan can anticipate all that needs to 
be done in a disaster, it is important to have a 
flexible and creative response system. 
Particularly after an earthquake, planning will 
be an ongoing activity. It must involve the 
stakeholders in a meaningful way. Public/private 
sector cooperation is absolutely essential. 
During recovery from the Lorna Prieta 
earthquake, Santa Cruz averted political and 
economic discord by being open and responsive. 
The City restructured its Incident Command 
System in midstream and it shared planning 
and implementation responsibilities with 
business representatives and volunteers. This 
approach enabled the City to provide security 
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uaul<>~~''-' area while 
on:he:strating a and recovery program. 
AU of these activities will he needed to 
recover from the of a 
1at.uuu5 for them is the hest form of insurance. 
EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING LOCAL 
POLICIES 
The effectiveness of local 
.. 
factors 
32 Submitted 
Department. 
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jJVU'-'"'" underwent revision in response 
to new information the 
about 
The ultimate effectiveness 
HU.UUJlULHtl'j UU!U«~)'IC Can he eX:I)eCted 
even over time. 
" The institution of both xc<JlUXi'-
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to resnoncl 
few surprising events. The 
the analysis of what had occurred and 
modification of existing policies in response to 
new technical information. One difficulty 
in that process is that decision-makers and the 
absolute answers to questions such 
as: "Is it safe or not? Will any further damage 
occur? Will it be damaged again unless I take 
certain actions now? Will the County stay out 
of litigation if certain actions are taken now? 
What's the magnitude of the next big 
earthquake likely going to be? Why don't we 
require that people engineer for a 7.0 and call 
that safe?" 
DAMAGE PREVENTION AND REDUCTION 
The concept of damage "prevention" is an 
inappropriate term since prevention isn't 
practical. Instead, the concept of mitigation for 
damage reduction should be the standard. 
Damage reduction through mitigation can be 
effectively achieved by continuing several 
activities: 
• Education 
• Development of earthquake construction 
techniques and codes 
" Extension of seismic retrofitting 
requirements to structures built before 
seismic safety codes were enacted 
• Identification of areas of high earthquake risk 
" Development of policies to mitigate potential 
damage to facilities located in high risk areas 
Consideration of land development policies 
in areas of higher earthquake risk will inevitably 
involve stressful debate over the probability of 
specific hazards. Similarly, debate over issues 
such as nonconforming rights to rebuild in 
known high hazard areas will be a recurrent 
problem. To help local jurisdictions deal 
effectively with these pressures, it is important 
for the State to enact legislation which allows 
local governing bodies to focus on the long term 
benefits provided by policies which mitigate 
of risk currently falls on the local!urisolctilon in 
land use decisions. Local 
need more '"""""·wt 
of and financial to 
encourage them to create locally applicable 
measures. This could include 
'"'UL'"''"" of in areas known to be 
highly susceptible to failure in significant 
seismic events and for which engineering based 
mitigation proves impractical or impossible. 
Such resources should also include money for 
the temporary or permanent relocation of 
families, businesses, government and other 
infrastructure in order to minimize the extent of 
future damage. The County believes that this 
might prove less costly than extensive 
demolition, damage repair, legal costs, and loss 
of economic vitality. Where such relocation 
methods prove infeasible (such as in the case of 
infrastructure) the State should provide 
statutory and financial support to encourage 
more traditional engineering-based mitigation 
measures, such as seismic retrofitting. Without 
such impetus and financial support, it seems 
unlikely that local jurisdictions can or will take 
the initiative in these times of limited budgets. 
If given sufficient tax or other incentives, the 
public can move to complete mitigation 
measures on its own, particularly if there was a 
potential for reduced government support for 
recovery where available mitigation measures 
have not been undertaken. 
REDUCING TIME AND COMPLEXITY OF 
COMMUNITY RECOVERY 
Local jurisdictions, particularly smaller ones, 
have insufficient capacity to unilaterally 
respond to the recovery needs of their 
community in events with the impact of Lorna 
Prieta. After the initial response period 
concluded, the enormity of the recovery effort 
and the degree to which basic, yet critical, 
policy decisions concerning recovery had not 
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state and federal ;u~t:nL:Ies 
recovery of the ~VJ<Auuuun 
poJllCH~s should address at least the 
sector 
resources within the response 
and recovery Santa 
County was only able to cope with its 
and reconstruction workload through the use 
of contacted services. There would have been 
no effective means of providing 
service to the community with the 
County workforce. The County developed 
the mechanisms to contract for services, such 
as determining whether the cost of such an 
undertaking would be eligible for state and 
federal reimbursement, but initially County 
staff was still committed entirely to 
earthquake repair efforts. Nonearthquake 
permit review essential to economic vitality 
of the community had to be deferred for 
three months. Had contracting for staff to 
perform repair permit review and inspection 
not been eligible for federal/state 
reimbursement then the County's recovery 
would have been unnecessarily delayed and 
the impact of the earthquake would have 
extended to those sectors of the community 
which were otherwise undamaged. 
• Specific plans for providing consistency with 
state or federally mandated hazard 
mitigation plans; 
• Standards for acceptable risk; 
• Standards for acceptable alteration. of 
discretionary land use approval processes; 
• A state policy outliniDg and defining the 
range of local discretion expected to be 
exercised in recovery and reconstruction land 
use policy; 
• Criteria for the requirement of stricter than 
normal standards in land use and 
construction where postearthquake data 
justifies their implementation; 
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" 
reconstruction 
"Governments should focus on and formalize 
process want to have in when the 
disaster strikes rather than 
tweak or around or 
'"''""'" ... '"""when to move as 
quickly as possible to help your community." 
To provide a basis for the effort to balance 
individual property rights with the mandate to 
public health and safety, local 
jurisdictions should be required by the State to 
develop community recovery plans with just as 
much emphasis, if not more, than is currently 
placed on immediate emergency response. 
Recovery is a much more complex endeavor 
with more dramatic and longer lasting 
implications than the immediate response. The 
delays and heavy workload involved with the 
policy amendment process may have had more 
of an effect on community recovery than the 
damage which had already occurred. Written 
guidance is needed that describes eligible costs 
for reimbursement. Had such advice been 
available at the time of the earthquake, some of 
the confusion, delay, and mistrust could have 
been avoided. 
City of Watsonville33 
COORDINATION BETWEEN FEDERAL, 
STATE, AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE 
AGENCIES 
The coordination of services between 
government and community service agencies is 
very important. The line of communications 
33 Submitted by the City of Watsonville, Office of the 
City Manager, in cooperation with the Def.artment of 
Recreation and the Office of the Fire Chie . 
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must be open from the start of response uuvu;;:.u 
to the end of the disaster recovery efforts. In 
improvements can be in the 
disaster management network between 
state, and local assistance. 
The goals and nn•»T;<Tlnn 1'.'"'-''-AH 
for state and federal disaster response 
should be reassessed to reflect the true nature 
and extent of caused by large 
"'"'ul\.lu.a"'""· Response should to 
the "real world" when managing a disaster that 
touches every part of our service delivery 
mission and goals statement for 
disaster response agencies should be pr<)m.otl~d. 
local ""''"""''"' 
roles of the various disaster response 
Their services should be directed at ?"'''""'"'~i'" 
from the loss of basic life and health 
""'~"'·"~".' food and water the 
Most of the ""'"'"'''" 
for disaster victims are reflective of 
concerns. with 
other basic survival needs are au'<'>'"""~ 
The 
to 
multicultural awareness a source of many 
the U!::>G.:>l•Cl 
future. 
FEMA RESPONSE 
'""""'"r'" This needs to 
residents. 
costs and availability dictate 
c""''""''" necessary from FEMA. 
Many Watsonville citizens are still 
find a home (15 months after the 
FEMA housing support need to adapt 
to local conditions. 
u"~"''A" victims should be treated less 
andmore The 
""'""''""r"'u needs to be reduced and .>u.uvuuc.u 
level). All information needs to be 
available in Spanish and other languages, as 
received financial assistance 
without the implications. Many 
saved the funds and in tents, 
unsure of what next to take. Other 
... ~''""'H some nonessential items such as a car, 
not that the check was the last of the 
FEMA aid. A dear of future 
and benefits should be explained before a 
"'"'~·"'"<"the one-time 
service groups. Local 
service groups can find that is suitable 
families located closer to their work than 
where FEMA located The local 
outreach workers know many of the victims and 
to work from. 
and local disaster service groups nr,mTiifiP·fi 
very valuable public information. 
The FEMA reimbursement rates for housing 
assistance and repair costs need to be adapted to 
the local economy. The rates used were far 
below the local costs of housing and building 
repair. 
Residents of temporary FEMA housing 
(mobile homes) should be dealt with in a more 
practical fashion. Each family should be worked 
with individually to find new homes. A 
cooperative relationship with local housing 
assistance groups will help in finding housing 
solutions. The long-term housing solutions 
require more local involvement with FEMA 
service workers. FEMA seemed to distance 
themselves from City and County housing 
groups. 
The FEMA policy on demolition of 
earthquake-damaged property needs to be 
updated and clarified. The final decision of 
whether the cost of demolishing earthquake-
damaged housing would be reimbursed wasn't 
made until late in the recovery effort; some are 
not made yet, over a year after the earthquake. 
There were many debates on covering cost of 
earthquake damages on some commercial 
structures. A FEMA policy on demolition 
expense coverage for vacant buildings that were 
already in disrepair prior to the earthquake is 
also needed. 
The assessment of damages to housing was 
poorly coordinated between FEMA and local 
inspectors. The City had performed 
by professional building inspectors and 
structural engineers. FEMA duplicated this 
service with their own inspectors. Many times 
the damage assessments were different. The 
for the had to be debated between 
lSD4~Ct<>r in the field. FEMA 
and 
'"""u''" as a team coordinated under a 
command This would 
mixed 
<1''\Pr+r.rc and FEMA 
and owners from 
messages between local 
LOMA PRIETA'S CALL TO ACf!ON 
logistical could have been 
dealt with earlier if the local, state, and federal 
agencies had been meeting and planning 
together. For example, the disaster assistance 
center (DAC) was located on the outskirts of the 
City. Transportation to the center was poor. The 
City had to organize a special transportation 
network from the Red Cross shelters to the 
center. 
After three months of operating the 
emergency shelters, Red Cross and local disaster 
service agencies were ready to close. The 
coordination between the City and County 
service agencies accepting responsibility for the 
victims was critical. This exchange required a 
good deal of outreach work with disaster victims 
located at the shelters. The Red Cross, County, 
and City outreach workers teamed together to 
provide the information and support to the 
shelter residents. For the most part, FEMA 
operated on its own. The effort would have 
worked much better if all groups would have 
approached the problem together. The local 
outreach workers could have used their 
experience to deal with the special cases, i.e., 
known drug addicts, perpetual homeless, as well 
as developmentally disabled. Local outreach 
workers are also familiar with the services and 
housing stock available for long term solutions 
which are most likely to be cost effective. 
STATE RESPONSE 
The ability to plan and establish a 
coordinated command structure is a common 
theme to our concern about better services 
between state, and local response 
"""'""'-~~J. More planning and is 
vital to this cause. An established planning and 
decision-making process should be nPvPiir.r•P" 
ties need to be between the 
local service groups and state and federal 
The gaps between service groups need 
and the of effort and the 
conveyance of mixed messages need to be 
eliminated. 
91 

CALL TO ACTION 
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM AFFECTED COMMUNITIES 
efforts are made. Based on the of this 
earthquake, Watsonville is currently working to 
improve the emergency response network. The 
following is a summary of these activities. 
Watsonville is developing emergency 
response agreements between all community 
response groups. These groups include City and 
County OES, medical clinics, school systems, 
utilities (gas, electric, telephone), emergency 
shelters, Red Cross, Salvation Army, Food Bank, 
religious groups, amateur radio, news media, 
Chamber of Commerce, and other community 
response agencies who need to develop a 
working relationship. We recommend that the 
mission of each response group be developed 
and charted for group review. Once a dialogue 
begins, many groups will surface and fill the 
response voids that the response group 
identifies. This community response group 
needs to include representatives who reflect the 
socioeconomic and cultural makeup of the 
community so that a variety of service needs are 
planned for. 
A response network for medical care, shelter, 
food supply, health care and resource allocation 
is also being developed. The communications 
needs, command structure, and service 
requirements (supplies, warehouses, should 
be part of a written plan to be approved by an 
involved. 
The community response team needs 
training. Watsonville is planning a town 
meeting to replay the Lorna Prieta 
Key response players will sit on a panel to 
discuss how they will respond. The goal of this 
training event is to find weaknesses in the 
planning. The training event is highly 
publicized to encourage community 
involvement and feedback. 
will then be scheduled. 
••uuuu"" accurate assessments of emergency 
response and long-term recovery needs. 
Obviously, communication and training are 
necessary for the system to function properly. 
The ongoing relationship between community 
groups needs to be supported by local 
government. The specific weaknesses in the 
response system need to be targeted and 
planned out. The team needs to attain positive 
results and train on the system periodically. 
Recovery Demands. There are many 
challenges for communities recovering from a 
major disaster. The logistical, financial and 
public information requirements are 
tremendous. We must develop systems that 
allow communities to bounce back quickly. For 
that reason, Watsonville makes the following 
recommendations. 
Adopt the incident command system and 
extend its use and its roles to include the 
recovery period. This system has proven to be 
an improvement over past models for managing 
disaster operations. Responsibility is spread in a 
command format that covers all response 
challenges. The system allows for 
decentralization of the emergency operations 
center. The EOC is used as a command post 
where the response plan is implemented and 
situation status is maintained. Only the disaster 
command staff (Emergency Services Director 
and lead emergency response team) need to be 
present in the EOC. Support staff and branch 
leaders can develop their operations at field 
~-'"·""v""· The entire response team leadership 
should meet on a scheduled basis to update the 
response plan. 
The recovery response team also needs 
'""""'"5 . Watsonville recommends that OES 
ucvc•uLJ courses in and logistics to 
reflect the actual demands of the recovery 
FEMA and OES rules and 
overlooked in our current 
The assessment process can be 
controversial and very difficult to manage. A 
94 
is needed languages). The 
should be universally adopted and 
':!."''""''-""persons must be trained in its use. Out-
of-town and structural 
should be aware of the and posting 
procedures. The forms should be easy to use and 
structured in a fashion to be with 
data 
rt<>vP:Inr•<>l1 to inform owners and 
tenants of their options. Procedures for 
obtaining inventories and personal!Jellontgl11gs 
from damaged buildings need to be developed. 
The City emergency services director, 
State and FEMA rer1res•enta 
need to understand their "'-'"""'""'"' 
processes that consider the 
local coordination between the business 
coJnrrlunti~andgo,~nlm<ent 
coordination between code enforcement 
~uuu;cu"' owners and tenants is very ~uu~un 
Written reconstruction process '"'""''-'U."' 
streamlined 
that do not constitute new construction 
remodel. A coordinated effort between 
'""''""ov" and church groups, trade 
uu1v'o"'' and other 
groups is necessary. 
Public information and rumor control are 
necessary after a disaster. Predisaster 
relations between the emergenC"y broadcast 
staff and that staff the 
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the 
response team, and the as a whole. 
The of donated resources 
coordination locally, statewide, 
and internationally. tons of 
resources arrive in a struck by 
disaster. Much of what is donated is not needed. 
A system for the actual needed 
resources and for and distributing 
them is also needed. For the of 
California Cities has a link between 
most cities in California. That network 
(Ci~link) could be used to communicate 
The arriving at local 
should be 
to manage 
the resources. 
A better undez·standing 
leaders best fit into disaster is 
are the elected leaders that should 
a role in recovery from a disaster. 
Accurate and 
for visual review disaster 
circumstances is but without 
formalize a 
shelters. 
The Red Cross and the 
sites with 
and Mass Care 
or 
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shelter managers, mutual 
should be contracted. 
In 
and credibility. They also serve as role 
models for children. Watsonville Recreation 
assisting earthquake victims and 
them to go to shelters rather than stay in make-
shift tents without sanitation, etc. 
Cities having significant minority 
populations must actively solicit those 
minorities to become involved as Red Cross 
shelter volunteers, or on site or disaster 
planning committees. 
Cities should meet quarterly with human 
service agencies that play roles in disaster 
services management, including but not limited 
to the Red Cross, food banks, health clinics, 
county health departments, and utility 
companies to share information on disaster 
response and coordination. 
"Unofficial" tent shelters are at best a 
headache-at worst a nightmare. The Callaghan 
Park "tent city" became a focal point of political 
protest, a media focus and the distribution point 
for dumped, donated commodities. Encouraged 
by leaders who felt minority groups were left 
out of the disaster service process, private tents 
were set up at Callaghan Park. This lack of 
inclusion was indeed a serious, ignorant 
omission from Watsonville's planning process! 
In-situ leadership evolved as services were 
demanded by victims. Media attention fueled 
the demands and encouraged entrenchment 
rather than relocation to Red Cross shelters. 
Victims insisted that they be allowed to remain 
retJWSlDect, a 
COUld have rm~,T<>nt'Prl 
""'"·""~'"'"u Park incident. Local Red Cross 
v1;~""""''"i<'u" must be aware of cultural and 
ethnic diversity and study disasters in other 
countries. Santa Cruz County Red Cross officials 
were not aware of the for use of tents 
so they were reluctant to set up tents early on in 
the disaster. Strategic placement of shelters at 
schools and other sites central to neighborhood 
areas may have prevented the ad hoc shelter 
and the poor conditions that followed. 
Plan for the sorting, storage and distribution 
of donated clothing and household items for 
earthquake victims. Limited occupancy 
buildings may have a use for warehousing 
supplies. Should another disaster occur in 
Watsonville, Callaghan Park will serve as a focal 
point for information, medical first aid, water 
and food distribution under the auspices of the 
City, Red Cross, a local health clinic, and other 
social service agencies. Tents, if they need to be 
erected, will be designated as under Red Cross 
shelter services operations. Public service 
announcements will direct those with donations 
to receiving and distribution locations operated 
by local community service groups. 
The importance of local disaster service 
providers meeting regularly cannot be 
overstated. It is vitally important that these 
groups meet, develop key contacts, identify each 
agency's mission in the provision of disaster 
services, and develop methods to identify and 
coordinate key services. Groups representing 
minority and special needs populations are 
essential to the disaster planning process. 
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